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For decades, people in other countries who face economic and political 
uncertainty have used United States currency as a store of value and as a medium of 
exchange.  Estimates dating back as far as 1960 indicate that half of all U.S. currency in 
circulation is held abroad.  Since currency can move undetected across borders, data and 
methods to estimate such holdings are inherently fragmentary and based on simplifying 
assumptions.  Thus, estimates of the total share of U.S. currency held outside the United 
States are quite speculative.  Nonetheless, the share has clearly grown over the past four 
decades.  Today, we estimate that around sixty percent of all Federal Reserve notes in 
circulation, or about $370 billion of the $620 in circulation, is now held abroad. 
U.S. dollars are often found in countries with volatile political and economic 
conditions.  Accordingly, much of the growth in overseas dollar usage during the past 
two decades has occurred in Latin America and in formerly socialist countries.  In many 
of these economies, citizens and small businesses continue to face unstable local 
currencies as well as underdeveloped banking and payment systems, and thus have 
difficulty accumulating savings and making transactions in local currencies.  As a result, 
many residents of unstable or crisis-prone countries opt to carry out critical and large 
saving and transaction functions in other currencies, including the U.S. dollar. 
The billions of dollars held overseas represent a windfall to U.S. taxpayers 
because of the seigniorage revenues generated by the added currency demand, and they 
also serve as a useful asset for dollar users outside the United States who have no other 
liquid and stable asset available.  However, the circulation of large quantities of U.S. 
dollars outside the United States also presents challenges.  In particular, the presence of 
U.S. dollars in areas outside the direct jurisdictional reach of the U.S. Secret Service 
makes them a potential target for counterfeiters, who range from organized professionals 
with sophisticated printing facilities and considerable skill to rank amateurs with access 
only to copying machines or inexpensive computer printers.  Counterfeiting is primarily 
carried out for economic gain but may also be associated with other crimes, including 
drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and terrorism. 
iii This study reaches three major conclusions about counterfeiting.  First, the 
incidence of counterfeit dollar passing is generally very low both inside and outside the 
United States, notwithstanding occasional large seizures of uncirculated counterfeits. 
Second, overseas banks and law enforcement agencies are eager to develop expertise, 
technology, and communication links with the Secret Service to detect and suppress 
counterfeiting activity.  Third, the International Currency Awareness Program (ICAP) has 
helped expand and strengthen working relationships between the U.S. Secret Service and 
foreign financial and law enforcement organizations. 
This study updates the first report, which was issued to the Congress in 2000. 
Much of the information presented in that report remains valid today.  As in the previous 
report, some figures and information were available only from discussions with various 
governmental and commercial sector officials; data gathered in such a way are inherently 
fragmentary.  However, the models used in this report to estimate the share of currency 
held overseas and the quantity of counterfeits in circulation generate results that are 
consistent with the information provided by the teams' interlocutors. 
This report was jointly drafted by the staff at the U.S. Treasury Departmental 
Offices, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Federal Reserve System for the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  The agencies represent an interagency group, the Advanced Counterfeit 
Deterrence Steering Committee, which includes representatives of the Treasury 
Departmental Offices, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Reserve Cash 
Product Office.  Contributing to this report were Ira Polikoff, Project Director for the 
International Currency Awareness Program, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Anthony 
Chapa, Special Agent in Charge of the Counterfeit Division, U.S. Secret Service; Ruth 
Judson, Economist, and Richard D. Porter, Senior Adviser, Division of Monetary Affairs, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Jeffrey Pruiksma, Staff Director, 
Cash and Custody Function, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
iv Executive Summary 
Introduction 
¾	 This study is the second of three that will report on the results of a long-term 
investigation into the use and counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad.  The Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve are conducting the investigation pursuant to section 807 of 
PL 104-132, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  The first 
report was issued in February 2000 and can be found on the Internet at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2000/200002292/default.htm. 
¾	 The audit program of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve has continued to open 
new lines of communication and data collection on the use and circulation of genuine 
and counterfeit U.S. banknotes abroad.  New sources of information include high-
level contacts in various foreign banking and law enforcement institutions, which 
have permitted the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to establish effective working 
relationships and channels for the timely transmission of information, and, ultimately, 
to work more effectively in the international arena.  The Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury expect that these benefits will grow as the program continues. 
Findings Regarding Currency Abroad 
¾	 Foreigners continue to hold U.S. currency for the same reasons that many once held 
gold coins outside of the countries where they were originally minted: Dollars are a 
safe store of value when the purchasing power of the domestic currency is uncertain 
or when other assets lack sufficient anonymity, portability, divisibility, liquidity, or 
security.  As a safe asset in an unpredictable world, dollars often flow into a country 
to displace part of the domestic currency during periods of economic and political 
upheaval and often remain long after the crisis has subsided. 
¾	 Estimates by the Federal Reserve suggest that 55 percent to 60 percent of the $620 
billion in U.S. currency outstanding at the end of 2001, or $340 billion to $370 
billion, was held outside the United States. 
v ¾	 Because currency can quickly move throughout the world, often without being 
detected, the determination of its location on any occasion is virtually impossible. 
Nonetheless, clearly the lion’s share of overseas U.S. currency is in emerging market 
economies.  We estimate that perhaps 25 percent of U.S. currency located abroad is 
held in Latin America, 20 percent in Africa and the Middle East, and about 15 percent 
in Asia.  The remaining 40 percent of overseas U.S. currency is likely held in Europe 
and the countries of the former Soviet Union and their neighboring trading partners, 
such as Turkey. 
¾	 The circulation of U.S. currency overseas provides benefits to both the United States 
and foreign users.  U.S. taxpayers gain by effectively receiving an interest-free loan in 
the amount of currency held overseas.  Foreign dollar holders benefit by acquiring an 
asset that is liquid, secure, and stable in value, characteristics that are often 
unavailable in their own country's currency during and after periods of economic and 
political turmoil. 
The Introduction of the 1996-Series New Currency Design (NCD) and 
the Upcoming 2003-Series Design 
¾	 A new currency design, known as NCD, was introduced in 1996, beginning with the 
$100 denomination.  The new design incorporated additional counterfeit-resistant 
features that make it easier for dollar users to authenticate the notes without 
specialized equipment. 
¾	 The incidence of counterfeiting of the new-design notes is dramatically lower than 
that of the older-design notes.  Among the pre-NCD $100s processed during 2001, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which processes by far the greatest portion 
of U.S. notes repatriated to the United States, detected 200 counterfeits per million 
notes processed, but among the NCD $100s in that period, it found only 35 
counterfeits per million notes processed. 
¾	 An education campaign preceding the NCD introduction to acquaint the international 
market with the new currency design and the no-recall policy on older-series notes 
vi was broadly successful.  As a result, both NCD and pre-NCD notes are now widely 
accepted in virtually all markets. 
¾	 After the initial launch of the NCD $100s, the distribution of information for the 
lower-denomination notes was less successful; overseas banks, financial institutions, 
and law enforcement reported difficulties with obtaining printed materials in adequate 
quantity or in a timely manner. 
¾	 Another design change is due for 2003, with similar goals of incorporating additional 
user-friendly authentication features and more counterfeit-resistant features.  The 
initial denomination in the new series to be issued will be the $20, which is scheduled 
to debut in the fourth quarter of 2003.  A worldwide education campaign for this new 
series is currently being organized. 
Findings Regarding Counterfeiting 
¾	 The international popularity of the U.S. dollar has made it a tempting target for 
counterfeiters.  However, the likelihood that a counterfeit note will be found in a 
batch of otherwise genuine overseas notes, is generally quite small, on the order of 1 
or 2 counterfeits in 10,000 notes, about the same ratio as is found inside the United 
States. 
¾	 Worldwide counterfeit currency detection capabilities appear to be high.  The ICAP 
teams found that at most commercial banks and money exchanges, clerks appeared to 
be able to detect even high-quality counterfeit dollars by hand examination of the 
notes, the most common and effective method.  To maintain these capabilities, the 
U.S. Secret Service routinely arranges training programs on the detection of 
counterfeit currency in regions with significant counterfeiting activity or in areas in 
which dollar circulation has recently begun, such as Ecuador, which officially 
adopted the dollar and removed its own currency, the sucre, from circulation in 
March 2000. 
¾	 The Secret Service has found that, over time, the relationships that develop from day-
to-day interactions between field agents and overseas agents encourage the Secret 
vii Service's law enforcement counterparts to increase the priority given to the 
investigation of counterfeiting.  In locations where permanent placement is not 
feasible, the Secret Service deploys task forces to target counterfeiters and provide 
training and support to local authorities. 
¾	 Given the nature of currency usage and flows, it is highly unlikely that substantial 
pools of counterfeit notes could circulate undetected for very long.  Extensive data-
gathering, discussions with currency dealers, observation of currency in circulation 
worldwide, and economic analysis all indicate that notes are exchanged sufficiently 
often that they regularly move through financial institutions and exchange houses, 
which we found to be generally capable of detecting counterfeits.  Moreover, 
although some currency is held in homes or “under the mattress” as a precaution 
against unforeseen events, at least a small share of these notes is always being moved 
in and out of general circulation.  As a result, notes sampled in cash deposits at 
Federal Reserve offices represent notes that have been in normal circulation along 
with notes that recently left the “mattress.” 
Innovations to Combat Counterfeiting 
¾	 The Secret Service has developed a website that law enforcement agencies and 
currency handlers can use to report counterfeits.  The website provides a useful 
mechanism for the Secret Service and the Federal Reserve to track worldwide 
counterfeiting and for financial institutions to check data on suspected counterfeits 
promptly and easily. 
¾	 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) 
program has also improved the repatriation rate of older-design notes and provides an 
efficient mechanism for the international markets to recirculate fit new-design notes. 
¾	 As a result of the ICAP trips and the operation of ECIs in Europe and Asia, it is now 
possible to determine in which cities and countries counterfeits are first detected in 
the wholesale collection chain.  This new intelligence permits the Secret Service to 
respond more quickly and strategically to emerging threats. 
viii Recommendations 
¾	 Since the Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) program has improved the efficiency 
and stability of the international dollar banknote markets, contributed enhanced data 
and qualitative information on international U.S. currency flows, and aided in the 
more timely detection and reporting of counterfeit U.S. banknotes, it should continue 
to operate and possibly expand as conditions warrant. 
¾	 Given the NCD and upcoming new-design notes’ greater resistance to counterfeiting, 
strategies to accelerate the repatriation of old-design notes should be considered. 
¾	 The Secret Service has obtained valuable information through the audit program, and 
should continue to draw upon information arising from the audits to evaluate its 
international strategy. 
¾	 The public education campaign contributed to the smooth reception of the new-design 
1996-series (NCD) $100 notes but had some major shortcomings for the introduction 
of the smaller denominations, particularly in overseas markets.  In the future, 
dissemination of information on any new currency design—especially training and 
educational material for both cash handlers and the general public—should reach the 
international markets well ahead of the actual notes in an appropriate range of foreign 
languages and should be readily available well after the initial issuance of the notes. 
ix 1  Introduction 
This study is the second in a series of three that are part of a long-term Treasury 
and Federal Reserve study of U.S. dollar usage and counterfeiting abroad undertaken as 
required by section 807 of PL 104-132, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996.  The program is currently known as the International Currency Awareness 
Program (ICAP), and it is an extension of an earlier effort, known as the Joint 
International Study Team (JIST), that preceded the introduction of the 1996-series NCD 
$100 note in March 1996.  The JIST was an effort on the part of the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve to address three issues: patterns of use and circulation of U.S. currency overseas, 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency overseas, and appropriate planning for the introduction of 
the new-design $100 note.  The successful introduction of the NCD $100 was viewed as 
extremely important because it represented the first significant redesign of U.S. currency 
in nearly sixty years.  The Treasury and the Federal Reserve recognized that a smooth 
overseas introduction of the NCD note in 1996 was particularly important because the 
majority of $100s in circulation were believed to be held overseas (table 1.1).  Both ICAP 
and JIST activities consisted of study trips to areas of the world where dollars were 
known to circulate in significant quantities and, later, the establishment of facilities to 
encourage both recirculation of fit currency and repatriation of old-series currency.
1 In 
addition, the ICAP and JIST teams gathered information on the educational materials that 
should be distributed abroad and sought to inform market participants about the 
characteristics of the new notes.  Part of the motivation for the educational campaign was 
to avoid the kind of confusion and panic that struck in Russia when the 1990-series $100 
note was introduced.  In that case, the U.S. ambassador to Russia had to appear on local 
television to address rumors that older-series notes were to be recalled. 
1.1  Design of the Study 
The study takes account of all available information and understanding 
accumulated by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve about overseas counterfeiting and 
1 “Fit” currency is currency that has already been in circulation, but is still in sufficiently 
good condition, or “fit”, for further use. 
1
currency holdings.  In accordance with the congressional mandate, the study is based on 
three components: models of U.S. currency usage overseas, models of counterfeiting 
Table 1.1 

U.S. Banknotes in Circulation, $100s in Circulation, and $100s Held Overseas 





















1965  38.0  8.1  21.4  48.3 
1970  12.1 23.8  5.7  47.5 
1975  23.1 29.8  10.0  43.2 
1980  49.3  39.5  23.8  48.4 
1985  81.2  44.6  45.8  56.4 
1990  140.2  52.3  85.7  61.1 
1995  241.5  60.2  169.2  70.1 
1999  386.2  64.2  254.6  65.9 
2000  377.7  67.0  255.7  67.7 











Sources: Columns 1 and 2: Treasury Bulletin, various issues.  Figures include vault 
cash but exclude coin. 
Column 4: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts (Release Z.1). 
abroad, and information obtained from country surveys with cash handlers and others 
knowledgeable about the extent of currency usage and counterfeiting issues abroad.
2 
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury have information on these subjects from a 
variety of sources, including U.S. Customs reports, shipment data from overseas 
banknote wholesalers and published proxies for those shipments, estimates based on in-
2 In the early phases of this project, ICAP teams also carefully inspected or “audited” 
large samples of currency in commercial banks for the presence of counterfeits. 
However, these “audits” uncovered very few counterfeits, produced no other useful 
information, were costly to conduct, and were difficult to arrange. As a result, large-
scale currency inspections were discontinued, but on an ad hoc basis, the U.S. Secret 
Service has inspected batches of counterfeits and suspected counterfeits on these 
overseas trips.  From time to time, at the team’s request, banks have offered genuine 
notes for the team’s inspection so that the fitness, or condition, of such circulating 
notes could be directly established; on these occasions, the teams have had another 
opportunity to look for counterfeits. 
2
country surveys from dollar–using countries, national surveys of domestic currency 
holdings, and a variety of empirical models developed by the Federal Reserve that 
estimate overseas flows or holdings based on realistic assumptions concerning 
international currency usage.  On the counterfeiting side, the U.S. Secret Service collects 
information from around the world on counterfeits that have been passed or seized and 
related information from country surveys.  In addition, the Federal Reserve collects data 
on counterfeits found in deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.  Finally, using data on cash 
processing and on notes passed both domestically and internationally, the Federal 
Reserve has developed models to estimate the quantity of counterfeit currency in 
circulation. 
1.2  International Demand for the U.S. Dollar 
Because of its relative stability and near-universal recognition and acceptance, the 
U.S. dollar functions as both a store of value and a medium of exchange when other 
stable or convenient assets are not available.  Thus, during times of economic or political 
crisis, cash in a stable and familiar currency such as the dollar is often sought as a 
portable and liquid hedge against possible devaluation.  Similarly, dollars are a popular 
medium of exchange in regional or cross-border trade when credit markets are 
undeveloped or banks are underdeveloped or unreliable. 
The Federal Reserve supplies currency on demand, so the quantity of currency in 
circulation increases when new demand originates anywhere in the world.
3  Currency in 
circulation outside the Federal Reserve and the Treasury was about $620 billion by the 
end of 2002.
4  Current estimates indicate that the proportion of U.S. currency held abroad 
3 As a share of domestic monetary aggregates in the United States, currency is relatively 
small: It comprises about half of the narrow monetary aggregate M1 and about 10 
percent of the broader monetary aggregate M2.  However, a large volume of currency 
is outstanding. Currency (including coin) in circulation outside banks as of October 
2002 was about $618 billion, or a little over $2,200 for every U.S. resident.  Adding 
vault cash held inside the United States increases overall currency holdings to around 
$671 billion or about $2,400 per capita. 
4 Currency in circulation is measured two different ways, depending on whether vault 
cash and coin are included.  The Treasury figures in table 1.1 include vault cash but 
exclude coin.  The Federal Reserve’s data, reported on the H.3 statistical release, 
include coin and vault cash.  On a monthly average basis, vault cash ranged from $42 
3
is about 60 percent of the amount in circulation, or roughly $370 billion.  Most of the 
currency in circulation is in the form of banknotes.  Table 1.1 shows the amount of paper 
currency in circulation as well as the amount in the largest active denomination, $100s. 
In value terms, the share of Federal Reserve notes held as $100s has increased from 
around 21 percent at the end of 1965 to around 70 percent at the end 2002.  In addition, 
the share of $100 notes estimated to be held outside the United States has also increased. 
As shown in the right-hand column of the table, the overseas share of $100s rose sharply 
over the period from 1975 to 1995 and has remained relatively stable since then at around 
two-thirds of all $100s. 
The international circulation of U.S. currency in Europe expanded after World 
War I in the wake of the hyperinflation induced by the obligations arising from the Treaty 
of Versailles.
5  At that time, U.S. currency was viewed favorably because the United 
States was still on the gold standard while Great Britain, whose currency was the most 
important rival to the dollar, remained off the gold standard until May 1925.  Other 
countries, such as Panama, adopted the dollar as their official currency.  More recently, 
dollar usage has expanded largely because of two events: the breakup of the former 
Soviet Union and episodes of high and volatile inflation in Latin America. 
During a crisis, the degree of dollarization and the magnitude of the dollar inflows 
depend on a country’s experience with dollars in the past and its economic circumstances. 
In particular, demand for dollars appears to depend on two factors.  First, dollar inflows 
are generally higher in richer countries, where people are able to buy dollars.  Second, the 
degree to which a country becomes dollarized depends on the level of development of, 
and the level of confidence in, the domestic banking system.  The less confidence people 
have that the value of their bank holdings in either dollars or local currency will be 
protected, the more likely they are to want to hold dollars in cash.  Similarly, the more 
developed the banking system, the more likely it is that people will have a wide variety of 
options for saving and for making transactions. 
billion to $46 billion during 2002.  The value of coin in circulation at the end of the 
third quarter of 2002 was $33.8 billion. 
5 It was around this time that the Federal Reserve began to collect information on 
overseas currency shipments to and from Europe (Porter and Judson, October 1996, 
note 9). 
4
Because many holders of U.S. currency view it as a form of insurance against 
future crises, they are reluctant to alter their dollar usage patterns even after the 
immediate crisis is past by either shifting out of cash holdings or by switching to another 
currency, such as the euro.  Thus, although changing circumstances may occur in the 
countries the teams visited, underlying patterns of dollar usage are likely to change only 
slowly in countries that already use dollars.  In countries that do not now use dollars to a 
significant degree, it is difficult to predict if and when a crisis prompting demand for a 
second currency might develop. 
1.3	 The Difficulty of Measuring the Extent of International 
Counterfeiting 
The dollar’s strong international presence and popularity make it an inviting 
target for counterfeiters: Where genuine dollars circulate and are accepted, counterfeits 
also have a chance of being accepted.  Inside the United States, jurisdiction over 
counterfeiting cases is held by the Secret Service, which routinely receives information 
about counterfeiting from the Federal Reserve, commercial banks, and local law 
enforcement authorities.  Outside of the United States, where, of course, it has limited 
jurisdiction, the Secret Service is both more dependent upon, and less connected to, other 
sources of information.
6  Further, procedures invoked when counterfeit notes are found 
overseas vary widely.  Thus, without ongoing, direct contact with its foreign law-
enforcement counterparts, the Secret Service cannot assess the true nature of the 
counterfeiting threat it faces abroad.  Preliminary results from our investigations indicate 
that Secret Service agents are now notified more promptly about suspected counterfeiting 
through the information channels and reporting mechanisms (e.g., the Secret Service 
counterfeit note search website) that have been developed. 
1.4  Organization of the Remainder of the Report 
The remainder of the report is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
introduction of the 1996-series new currency design (NCD).  Chapter 3 discusses the 
6 The Secret Service is unable to act outside U.S. borders without the consent of the host 
country. 
5
organization of the country trips and highlights of the information on currency usage 
obtained from them.  Chapter 4 presents the estimates of the quantity and location of U.S. 
currency abroad.  Chapter 5 discusses the business side of the international currency 
operations and the Federal Reserve’s role.  Chapter 6 explains how counterfeiting works 
and what is known about the geographic distribution of counterfeiting activity abroad. 
Chapter 7 presents a model and estimates of the overall potential size of international 
counterfeiting activity.  A final chapter provides a brief summary and conclusion. 
6
2	 The New Currency Design: Introduction, Distribution, 
and Results 
The introduction of the 1996 new currency design (NCD), although not a central 
responsibility of the ICAP teams, was an important development about which ICAP 
teams have been collecting information since the introduction of the $100 note in March 
1996.
7  Properly educating the public at home and abroad will continue to be very 
important in light of the upcoming introduction of a new note design in late 2003.  The 
1996 design was developed to counteract several developing problems related to 
counterfeiting and authentication (determination that a note is genuine).  First, unlike 
other currencies, the pre-NCD dollar designs had few counterfeit-resistant features that 
could be easily checked by a dollar user.  Thus, some dollar users in the international 
market have had a strong preference for uncirculated currency still packaged in the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) wrappers.
8  While the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York could supply new (uncirculated) currency to these overseas users, it is less 
efficient for dollar users to return circulated currency and obtain new currency than it 
would be for them to simply recirculate the existing currency.  Second, the pre-NCD 
currency, while easily recognized by users, had been essentially unchanged for six 
decades and was likely to become increasingly vulnerable to counterfeiting because of 
ongoing advances in color printing, computing, and electronic copying technology.  A 
number of these concerns have been borne out.  For example, the share of counterfeiting 
using inkjet printers increased in the late 1990s from less than 1 percent of counterfeits 
seized domestically in 1996 to more than 40 percent in 2001.  The upcoming new note 
series will include both additional overt security features to ease authentication by 
individual dollar users and additional covert security features for use by law enforcement 
and the Federal Reserve. 
7 The NCD denominations were issued at different times over the course of several years, 
beginning with the $100s in March 1996 and ending with the $5s and $10s in May 
2000. 
8 These packages of new notes are called “cash packs” and contain 16,000 notes. 
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2.1  Overview: Goals, Programs, and Results 
The goals for the new design covered three broad areas.  First, since the NCD was 
the first major change in U.S. dollar design in decades, a smooth introduction was highly 
desirable.  Second, the addition of counterfeit-resistant features that could be detected 
with the naked eye was designed to make dollar users more comfortable that they could 
authenticate their currency.  By extension, it was hoped that dollar users would be more 
willing to accept recirculated currency.  Third, the addition of new counterfeit-resistant 
features was expected to reduce the incidence of counterfeiting. 
Table 2.1 

Counterfeit $100 Detection Rates at Federal Reserve Banks, Pre-NCD and NCD

Counterfeits per million notes of same type 
Year  Pre-NCD  NCD 
1996  76.6  0.8 
1997  158.0  7.6 
1998  195.2  19.0 
1999  52.1  199.5  27.1 
2000  39.8  139.8  27.1 
2001  48.1  200.3  34.8 





In order to meet these goals, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve took two 
concrete steps.  First, the U.S. Treasury Department conducted an international education 
program, which facilitated the smooth introduction of the new design.  Second, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York established a network of facilities to hold and 
redistribute U.S. dollars to the international market; these are discussed in chapter 5. 
These facilities, known as extended custodial inventories (ECIs), have aided in the 
recirculation of fit currency, which has lowered the cost of using dollars for international 
users.  They have increased the ready availability of U.S. banknotes overseas, thus 
facilitating the penetration of NCD notes.  Moreover, their presence has enabled the 
Federal Reserve to remove many of the pre-NCD notes from overseas circulation. 
Reducing the incidence of counterfeiting, the third goal, was also met.  The rates of 
counterfeiting of the new design in 2002 through November were less than one-eighth 
those of the older-design notes, averaging just over 23 notes per million (table 2.1).  The 
incidence of counterfeiting of new-design notes is very low.  As the new-design notes 
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displaced older-design notes, overall counterfeiting rates declined—the rate for 2002 
through November was nearly 50 percent lower than the rate for 1996. 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the U.S. Treasury's program to introduce 
the NCD notes and the lessons drawn from that experience for the introduction of the 
next new-design note series.  Additional details on the ECI program and its results are in 
chapter 5.  Additional details about counterfeiting and the Secret Service's programs to 
reduce it are in chapter 6. 
2.2  Introducing the New Currency Design: Lessons for the Future 
The Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System are responsible 
for producing and distributing currency respectively and for informing dollar users about 
design and policy changes related to the dollar.
9  In the mid-1980s, the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System became concerned that U.S. currency 
would become increasingly vulnerable to counterfeiting because of continuing rapid 
advances in reprographic technology.  As a result, the Treasury decided that a basic 
redesign of U.S. currency was necessary to maintain the security and integrity of U.S. 
currency.  The new currency design would have several new counterfeit-deterrent 
features to keep U.S. currency one step ahead of advances in equipment, such as desktop 
computers, scanners, and printers, that could be used for opportunistic counterfeiting. 
Moreover, it was recognized that the ongoing improvements in reprographic technology 
would make the counterfeiter’s job increasingly easy.  To combat that threat, U.S. 
currency would have to undergo a sequence of basic redesigns every eight years or so, 
perhaps indefinitely or until the threat clearly diminished. 
Because the new counterfeit-deterrent features would be effective only if 
consumers and cash handlers recognized and actively used them, an aggressive education 
campaign was undertaken to ensure that the public understood the new features of the 
NCD.  The campaign drew on the combined resources of both public and private 
organizations to communicate key messages regarding the NCD to a broad international 
audience.  These organizations included the U.S. Treasury Departmental Offices, the 
9 The Treasury produces currency and is responsible for currency design.  The Federal 
Reserve is the Treasury's agent for currency distribution. 
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Federal Reserve, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the U.S. Secret Service, other 
government agencies, including the U.S. State Department (U.S. embassies and the U.S. 
Information Agency), a private contractor, several communications subcontractors, 
corporate partners, association groups and the media. 
The introduction of the 1996-series NCD currency was free of major problems, 
and in general the currency itself and the informational materials were well received. 
(Indeed, the Central Bank in Paraguay used the U.S. brochures as a model for promoting 
the introduction of a new design for its 50,000 guarani note.)  The NCD notes moved into 
circulation without any significant disruptions both within the United States and abroad. 
Such a reception abroad was especially welcome because of the prospect of rejection of 
the old notes coupled with uneasiness about the new one, especially in countries like 
Russia, where U.S. currency plays an important role in the population’s savings and in 
the country’s banking system.  Hence, a smooth introduction overseas was a critical 
concern throughout the planning process and received significant attention as part of the 
overall strategic plan. 
Despite the general success of the $100 NCD introduction, the follow-up 
campaigns for the NCD designs for the $50s, $20s, $10s and $5s were somewhat less 
successful.  Throughout the ICAP visits, three types of changes were suggested for future 
currency design introductions.  First, banks indicated that the elapsed time between the 
unveiling of the new note and its issue date was insufficient.  Some banks and currency 
exchange houses, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, did not receive the 
relevant information until after the introduction of the new notes.  Initially, this region 
was to have been given the same emphasis as Russia, but unfortunately the contractor 
chosen to implement the campaign did not recognize that a substantial quantity of dollars 
was held in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in Argentina and Peru. 
Similarly, the recent dollarization in Ecuador and El Salvador, which occurred in 2000 
and 2001 respectively, came at a time when there was no effective information program 
in operation.  In the future, distribution plans for educational materials will need to take 
more careful account of the time required for both shipping and distribution of these 
materials to various regions in the world as well as the appropriate response to take when 
events such as Ecuador’s dollarization occur.  Many central banks and bankers’ 
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associations with whom the teams met indicated that they would be happy to assist in 
distributing materials to banks and other dollar handlers, and those channels should be 
used in addition to the other channels used for the NCD introduction, including 
commercial banks, the U.S. Information Agency and U.S. embassies and consulates. 
Second, banks and other dollar users had great difficulty obtaining additional 
materials about the new currency after the immediate introduction period, and in some 
cases supplies of the materials were insufficient.  Diplomatic contacts did not always 
know where to obtain more materials, and the materials themselves contained no 
information about where more copies could be obtained. 
This situation existed in virtually every region visited by ICAP teams.  To avoid 
repeating these difficulties, the next introduction should take three steps.  First, since 
nearly every bank and institution has some Internet access, place the materials on the 
Internet.  Second, designate a single central mailing address to which requests for 
information can always be directed.  Both the Internet address and the mailing address 
should be clearly listed on all informational material.  Third, keep adequate stocks of 
informational materials readily available even after the introduction has occurred to meet 
ongoing needs.  These issues are being specifically addressed by the public relations firm 
that has been selected to conduct the domestic and international public education 
campaign for the forthcoming new note design, which is due to begin with the 
introduction of the $20 in the fall of 2003.  Key foreign countries for the campaign 
include Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Russia, and Turkey, but the campaign will 
also include countries in various stages of dollarization.  In addition, the contractor is 
required to provide direct mail services to include addressing services, 
warehousing/clearinghouse services, and postage. 
A third type of comment heard by ICAP visits involved requests for specific 
training on handling and authenticating NCD notes.  Both cash handlers and law 
enforcement officials in countries visited expressed interest in training on the technical 
features, including the security thread, the optically variable ink (OVI), and the micro 
printing.  In all instances, the Secret Service special agent assigned to the team made 
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arrangements with the appropriate field offices to provide the assistance requested. 
Future educational efforts will include additional technical advice and training.
10 
As of mid-2002, the proportion of NCD notes in the stock of circulating $100 
notes is 85 percent (the comparable figure for $50s is 80 percent).  The fact that 15 
percent of $100s are still of the old design seven years after the introduction of the new 
design indicates that the transition to the NCD notes has been slow but steady, and that 
the rollout strategy has not been overly aggressive.  In fact, the promotional and 
educational messages regarding continued official acceptance of the old currency might 
be considered to have been a little too successful.  The ICAP teams found that many 
dollar users had little preference for the new series notes.  While counterfeiting is rarely a 
serious problem, especially given the superior resistance to counterfeiting of the new-
series notes, a more rapid and thorough transition to the new series would be desirable. 
Moreover, as pre-NCD notes become less common, sorting, processing and 
authentication become more efficient for all cash handlers.  To this end, a clear statement 
should be prepared to explain that while older-series notes will remain legal tender 
indefinitely, the security features of the new-series notes provide greater protection 
against counterfeiting and are preferable on that account. 
10 For example, in 2002 in Latin America alone, the U.S. Secret Service planned and 
conducted sixteen counterfeit detection seminars in eight countries for nearly 5,000 
banking and police officials. 
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3  Country Surveys of Currency Usage: The ICAP Trips 
3.1  Background for the Currency Surveys 
The NCD $100 note represented the most dramatic design change ever seen in a 
Federal Reserve note.  Some difficulties had followed the foreign introduction of its 
predecessor, the 1990-series $100 note.
11  Hence, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
sought a smoother international introduction in 1996.  During 1994 and 1995, teams from 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve conducted a series of trips abroad with the goal of 
addressing three questions: First, where and how do U.S. dollars circulate outside the 
United States?  Second, where and how do counterfeits circulate, and how are they 
detected and handled outside the United States?  Third, what should be done to make the 
introduction of the 1996-series NCD notes as smooth and trouble-free as possible? 
The teams usually consisted of officials from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Secret Service, and 
the Treasury.  The teams met with officials from U.S. embassies, consulates, and related 
institutions; officials of the host country finance ministries and central banks; 
counterfeiting enforcement officials; currency dealers and handlers at banks, currency 
exchanges, and valuables handling services; and various trade associations representing 
these groups.  In addition, other authorities, organizations, businesses, and individuals 
were visited as conditions dictated. 
In 1994 the teams first visited wholesale banknote distribution centers in Europe 
and Asia to assess the reception that a newly designed $100 note might receive by the 
banks and other institutions involved in distributing U.S. currency internationally.  Next, 
the teams visited the two countries that were believed to have the largest dollar holdings, 
Argentina and Russia.
12  Then, in September and October of 1995, a team visited the 
11 These notes, issued beginning in August 1991, featured a security thread and 
microprinting. 
12 As a precursor to the Russian trip, Treasury and Federal Reserve representatives also 
visited one of the new countries that had been part of the former Soviet Union, Belarus. 
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Middle East, a region that historically has been a significant importer of dollars.  The 
countries visited on this trip were Turkey, Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates.  After the 1996 legislation, Treasury and Federal Reserve officials made three 
trips to Asia to study dollar usage in eight economies: Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.  In 1997, Treasury and Federal 
Reserve officials also conducted a trip to four countries in eastern Europe that were using 
dollars in the process of moving from a centralized, Soviet-style organization of their 
economies to market relationships: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.  In 1997 and 
1998, two trips were made to six Latin American countries that have had varying degrees 
of dollarization over their history: Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Panama, and Paraguay.  In 1998, a very brief trip was taken to South Africa, which has 
become an important source of counterfeits recently.  In 1999, ICAP teams visited three 
other Latin American countries with varying degrees of dollar usage: Chile, Argentina, 
and Peru.  In the time since the first report was written, ICAP teams visited China, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
Table 3.1 





economies visited  Countries 
Africa  South  Africa* 
Asia  11  Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 








7  Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia 
Latin America  11  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, and Peru. 
Middle East  5  Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and United 
Arab Emirates 
1 
*At a conference in South Africa in 2001, an ICAP team met with central bank officials 
from all of the Southern African Development Community countries: Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 




ICAP and Related Currency Trips 
Location  Time  of  visit(s) 
Argentina  October 1994, November 1999 
Bahrain  ber  1995 
Belarus  1994 
Brazil  1997 
Bulgaria  ber  1997 
Cambodia  1997 
Chile  ber  1999 
China  ber  2002 
Colombia  1998 
Dominican Republic  October 1998 
Ecuador  2002 
El Salvador  May 2002 
Egypt  ber  1995 
Hong Kong  January 1995, October 1996 
Indonesia  1997 
Korea  July-August 1998 
Latvia  ber  1997 
Lithuania  ber  1997 
Mexico  December 1996, April 1998 
Paraguay May  1997 
Panama October  1998 
Peru  ber  1999 
Philippines  ber  1996 
Poland  ber  1997 
Romania  ber  1998 
Russia  August 1995, June 1997, June 2000 
Saudi Arabia  September 1995 
Singapore  January 1995, January 1997 
South Africa  May 1998, June 2001 
Switzerland  November 1994, April 2001 
Taiwan  ber-October  1996 
Thailand  1997 
Turkey  September 1995, April 2001 
United Arab Emirates  September 1995 
United Kingdom  November 1994 




















The ICAP visits have resulted in numerous senior-level relationships among 
Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, U.S. diplomatic officials, and other agents posted 
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in other countries and commercial bankers, global and regional wholesalers, and 
valuables handlers.  These relationships support the exchange of information, and can be 
instrumental in formulating responses to various international currency crises. 
3.2  Criteria for Country Selection 
Starting with the initial trips in 1994 in preparation for the introduction of the 
NCD $100s in 1996, ICAP teams have made about two dozen trips to nearly three dozen 
economies connected with a total of almost four dozen countries, table 3.1.  All regions 
of the globe have been covered with repeat visits to a few locations: Argentina, Hong 
Kong, Mexico, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, and Turkey. 
The teams selected the locations (table 3.1) for visits and follow-up contacts on 
the basis of business, economic, and security considerations.  Specifically, the teams 
visited places that had large dollar inflows or outflows, and in which dollar activity was 
otherwise indicated to be significant by Federal Reserve and Secret Service contacts and 
reports.  One exception was Colombia: It was selected because it has consistently been a 
major source for counterfeits smuggled into the United States and successfully passed on 
to the public.  In some of these economies, dollars enter the economy only through 
wholesale transit points; in others, dollars are a multipurpose asset and are used for 
savings, domestic transactions, and trade with neighboring countries.  Many countries fall 
in between these two extremes. 
3.3  Use of U.S. Dollars Abroad: Patterns 
The dollar is widely used in many countries as a store of value, a transaction 
medium, and a unit of account even when it is not the official currency.
13  In countries 
with underdeveloped banking sectors, cash is used to settle transactions of all 
magnitudes; in countries with the additional burden of unstable currencies, U.S. dollars 
are held in cash as a store of value, used for many transactions, and often are the unit of 
13 For earlier estimates of the foreign component of currency stocks and flows and related 
issues, see, for example, Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell, and Spindt (1987); Blinder 
(1996); Feige (1996); Frankel (1995); Lindsey (1994-95); Mueller (1994-95); Porter 
(1993); Porter and Judson (April and October 1996); Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996); Seitz 
(1995); Sprenkle (1993); and Summer (1990, 1994). 
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account, especially for larger transactions.  Even in some countries with developed 
banking sectors and stable currencies, dollars are the preferred currency for travelers, for 
cross-border trade, for settlement of large cash transactions, and for transactions in the 
informal or gray sector. 
The countries visited by the groups provided examples of the varying conditions 
in which people choose to use and hold U.S. banknotes.  Although the relative 
importance of particular reasons varies with economic and political conditions, we found 
five basic motivations for holding and using cash dollars.  First, in times and places 
where the political or economic situation is uncertain, dollars are held for security against 
inflation and general calamity.  Second, expatriate workers throughout the world often 
carry their earnings to their home countries in dollars, and between visits home, some of 
these workers hold dollars in cash rather than in a bank.  Third, travelers to other parts of 
the world carry dollars because they are easier to exchange than local currencies.  Fourth, 
cross-border trade in many areas is conducted largely in dollars.  Fifth, the informal or 
“off the books” sectors in many economies are highly dollarized.
14 
Although the circumstances in each country are unique and it is difficult to 
generalize, during a crisis demand for U.S. dollars (or indeed any other currency that 
circulates widely outside its home country) tends to follow certain patterns.
15  A crisis, 
often with both political and economic overtones, arises that leads to increased dollar 
usage.  In many cases, growing fiscal deficits are eventually financed by rapid money 
creation, which leads to inflation.  Surging prices sharply reduce the purchasing power of 
the domestic currency and the value of accumulated savings.  Monetary and fiscal 
reforms are proposed or promised, but if they come at all, their arrival is usually slow and 
14 It is often asserted that a major source of demand for cash dollars is the world drug 
trade. However, a high but plausible estimate of the total annual value of the 
worldwide drug trade would be about $500 billion, with the amount in the United 
States about one-tenth of that.  If currency turns over at the rate measured in consumer 
surveys, about once a week, and all stages of the drug trade use dollars, the drug trade 
would still require only about $10 billion in currency, or less than 1.7 percent of the 
total quantity of U.S. dollars now in circulation. 
15 Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995) discuss the forces affecting currency holdings in 
countries experiencing high inflation but not hyperinflation.  See also Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996), Vegh (1992), Savastano (1996), and Kamin and Ericsson (2003). 
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erratic.  Inflation is correspondingly erratic, which in turn generates uncertainty about the 
future purchasing power of both cash and bank holdings denominated in domestic 
currency.  Similarly, high and unstable inflation complicates the calculation and 
evaluation of any large or long-term financial transactions or investments, such as leases 
or time deposits. 
Residents of countries experiencing these crises naturally seek other, more stable 
assets, and the dollar is often the most convenient and familiar of the available assets. 
Similarly, they seek to set prices and conduct financial negotiations in terms that are less 
likely to be affected by domestic inflation.  Thus, as inflation accelerates, the first use of 
the dollar is as the unit of account for large-scale and longer-term transactions in the 
economy.  As “dollarization” spreads, more transactions for large items like cars and real 
estate are either priced in dollars or conducted in dollars.  As the realization that having 
dollars will prevent further losses spreads across the economy, dollar inflows accelerate. 
In a simple model of this process, the demand for the foreign currency (dollars) depends 
on the variability of inflation rates and on the difference between the inflation rates of 
United States and the developing country.  The larger the variability and the difference, 
the greater will be the demand for dollars.
16 
The degree to which a country becomes dollarized and the degree to which 
residents prefer cash dollars to dollar-denominated bank accounts depend on confidence 
in the domestic banking system.  Periodic bouts of inflation often wipe out the savings 
held in domestic currency, which encourages flight to other assets.  Interest rate 
premiums and indexation of accounts for domestic inflation are alternatives to 
dollarization, but they are only effective when people have confidence that they will 
actually provide full protection against inflation.  Similarly, allowing dollar-denominated 
deposits is not always sufficient to eliminate a flight to the cash dollar: The bitter 
experience of having one’s foreign currency account confiscated, devalued, or made 
inaccessible even once is enough to keep many people from trusting banks for a very 
long time. 
A country’s demand for cash dollars also depends on its economic circumstances: 
To purchase dollars, countries must have something of value to exchange.  Thus, richer 
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countries or countries with well-developed export sectors are more likely to be able to 
afford to buy dollars. 
Although dollars flow into countries when the domestic currency weakens or 
political crisis looms, they often remain when the crisis passes.  For example, an 
estimated 50 percent of the currency that flowed into Argentina in the late 1980s, into the 
Middle East before Operation Desert Storm, and into Taiwan after the 1996 crisis in the 
straits is still in those areas.  Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate that dollars will remain 
abroad even after local currencies stabilize in parts of eastern Europe, the former Soviet 
Union, and Latin America. 
3.3.1  Newly Dollarized Economies: Ecuador and El Salvador
17 
Ecuador and El Salvador both dollarized in the past two years, and in both 
countries dollarization proceeded fairly smoothly.  However, their paths to dollarization 
were radically different.  In January 2000, Ecuador found itself in political and economic 
crisis, with high inflation, a depreciating currency, and falling income.  In these dire 
circumstances, Ecuador announced that it would begin withdrawing its national currency, 
the sucre, and shift to dollars over a short period beginning in March 2000.  Despite the 
fact that Ecuador’s dollarization was a move made in desperation, it initially worked to 
stabilize the economy. 
In contrast to Ecuador, El Salvador dollarized in 2001 after having its national 
currency exchange rate pegged to the dollar for several years.  Rather than recalling its 
national currency, as Ecuador did, El Salvador is simply not re-issuing colons when they 
are returned to the Central Bank in the normal course of business.  The dollar has 
replaced the colon relatively quickly in the cities, but the transition has been slower in the 
countryside.  As with Ecuador, the initial experience with dollarization has been positive. 
16 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, section 8.3) 
17 The jury is still out on whether dollarization plays a role in improving the welfare of 
countries that adopt the dollar as their currency.  In a comparison of countries that 
dollarized and those that did not, Edwards and Magendzo [2002] find that, in dollarized 
countries, inflation is lower but its volatility is about the same.  However, they also 
find that real macroeconomic growth is lower, a result that they suspect may be due to 
greater difficulties in accommodating terms of trade or capital flow shocks. 
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Despite recently suffering two devastating earthquakes, a collapse of coffee prices, and a 
recession, El Salvador was able to benefit somewhat from lower interest rates and relative 
economic stability.  Both countries are relatively small and poor, and thus the amount of 
U.S. currency in circulation in each is estimated to be relatively small, no more than $1 
billion in each. 
3.3.2  Argentina: A Long-Term Dollar User 
For the past several decades, Argentina has experienced high and chronic 
inflation.  In spite of eight major stabilization plans (an average of two per decade) and 
countless other attempts at reform, Argentina never managed to reduce its annual 
inflation to a double-digit rate for more than a year at a time until the 1990s.  The surges 
of hyperinflation in 1975 and in the late 1980s resulted in a persistent “dollarization” of 
the economy.  Beginning in the 1970s, dollars were increasingly used for settling current 
transactions and as a unit of account. 
In April 1991, Argentina embarked on its most successful and ambitious 
stabilization attempt, pegging its local currency to the dollar at parity using a currency 
board structure, in which the supply of domestic currency was rigidly limited by the 
amount of foreign reserves held by the central bank.
18  The new policy reversed 
Argentina’s high inflation, which had averaged over 320 percent per year for the 16 years 
prior to the creation of their currency board.  After the board came into existence, 
inflation was virtually nonexistent for over a decade.  However, after a series of shocks 
and considerable difficulty in maintaining fiscal discipline, the dollar peg finally 
collapsed in late 2001, and Argentines saw their currency rapidly depreciate from a 1-to-1 
peg to about 4 to the dollar.  Clearly, while Argentina’s currency board brought some 
economic tranquility, especially in terms of reduced inflation and a lower level of interest 
rates, in the end the recurring fiscal problems overwhelmed the economy and 
policymakers opted to devalue the currency.  The large group of dollar banknote holders 
in the country have benefited greatly from their decision to hold cash, and the dollar is 
18 This policy had many interesting historical precedents in Argentina.  See, for example, 
Della Paolera and Taylor (2001). 
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now more popular than ever.  Well over $20 billion in U.S. banknotes may have been in 
Argentina in the early 1990s and perhaps $50 billion may be there now. 
3.3.3  The Former Soviet Union 
Russia and some other former Soviet republics have suffered from high inflation, 
economic instability, an underdeveloped banking sector, a history of confiscation of bank 
deposits and of unwarranted and inequitable currency recalls, and, until recently, lack of 
convertibility between local currencies and “hard” currencies such as the dollar.  These 
conditions have contributed to a high level of dollar use in transactions, accounting, and 
savings.
19  Across Russia, the majority of households hold some dollars, and many 
households use dollars as their chief store of value.  The prevalence of dollars, the 
sophistication of users, and the degree to which news and rumors about dollars spread is 
quite high in Moscow and a few other financial centers but not elsewhere in Russia.  The 
official attitude toward the prevalence of the dollar in Russia is mixed.  Although dollars 
may be legally held in cash or in bank accounts, the Russian Central Bank supports “de­
dollarization,” or a return to the ruble. 
Interestingly, in the absence of a suitable alternative medium for transactions, 
dollars were used as a settlement medium within Russia and among countries that were 
formerly part of the Soviet Union after the collapse of communism but before the 
massive inflation of the 1990s.  Though dollars had a substantial foothold in Russia, their 
usage grew further during the rapid inflation.  On average, Russians imported about 
$2 billion per month in U.S. currency from about 1994 to 1996.
20  More recently, in 1998 
and 1999, dollar exports to Russia slowed somewhat, reflecting increased financing 
difficulties within Russia after the unexpected default on debt obligations in August 
1998.  The event caused some banks in the wholesale international currency trade to 
tighten the terms on which they made short-term credit extensions to Russian banks.  In 
19 Although the group visited only Belarus and western Russia, patterns of dollar usage 
are believed to be comparable throughout the former Soviet Union. 
20Exports of dollars to Russia were probably high before 1994, but during the early 
1990s, banks reporting their shipments to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were 
reporting intermediate destinations (e.g., London or Zurich) rather than final 
destinations (e.g., Russia). 
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addition, Russia raised the tax on imported foreign currency.  An important factor 
restraining currency imports into Russia could well have been the softness in the world 
oil market over the early part of this period, which reduced the resources available for 
dollar purchases from abroad. 
The ultimate impact of the euro introduction on dollar usage in Russia is as yet 
unknown.  The euro has certainly become the currency of choice for Russians headed for 
European destinations, and in this regard the dollar has been displaced to some extent. 
Nonetheless, the dollar is still very popular as a vehicle for cash savings, although there 
are some anecdotal reports that Russians began to shift their portfolios in 2002, when 
euro banknotes became available and when the value of the euro approached parity with 
the dollar. 
3.3.4  Other Areas 
Much of eastern Europe was highly dollarized in the early years after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, but the use of dollars has waned as these countries have become 
more stable and have begun to develop a financial infrastructure.  Nonetheless, dollars 
and other cash are still heavily used for tourism, for cross-border trade, and in the 
informal sector, with the euro increasingly used in and near the euro zone. 
This transition is ongoing; during the mid- and late 1990s, dollars were estimated 
to represent about half of the currency stocks in the two Baltic countries we visited, 
Latvia and Lithuania.  When the currency of Bulgaria, the lev, collapsed in 1996, falling 
to less than one-seventh of its purchasing power in dollars at the beginning of the year, 
the country imported as much as $50 per person.  Poland appears to be less dollarized 
than other eastern European countries in the formal sector, but the informal sector is still 
quite cash-intensive.  Since the arrival of the euro, it is not known whether the euro 
simply replaced the German mark or whether it also began to displace the dollar. 
In western Europe, the banking sector is highly developed, and the domestic 
currencies are stable.  Thus, dollars are rarely used there as a store of value or means of 
transaction.  However, several large wholesalers are based in western Europe; they 
supply dollars to, and buy dollars from, correspondents in eastern Europe, the Middle 
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East, and Africa and sell dollars to customers of their own branches for use in tourism 
and business in other parts of the world. 
Similarly, banks in Hong Kong and Singapore trade dollars with clients for travel 
and for cash transactions, and they supply a large network of correspondent banks in 
countries where cash dollars are used heavily, including Burma, Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and several East African 
countries.  Dollars are the currency of choice in Cambodia and used to a considerable 
extent in Vietnam, especially in urban areas.  Heightened political tensions between 
Taiwan and China have led Taiwan residents to import substantial amounts of dollars for 
use as precautionary savings, though anecdotal reports suggest that they might recently 
have begun to diversify into euros. 
All forms of dollar usage are represented in the Middle East.  Throughout the 
region, dollars are the preferred currency for travelers.  In the Gulf States, local 
currencies are stable, so dollars are reserved for cross-border trade and travel.  Traders 
from the rest of the Middle East and the former Soviet Union use dollars for their 
purchases.  Residents carry dollars when traveling outside the region, and expatriate 
workers carry dollars to their home countries.  In Turkey, dollars are used both for trade 
and travel and for domestic transactions and saving because of persistent high inflation. 
In Egypt, dollars are used very little except for travel. 
Dollar usage has had a long history in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Many 
Latin American countries used dollars exclusively or in large part at one time in their 
history: Argentina, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay 
fall under this heading.  Residents of these countries began to use dollars for the same 
reasons as in other countries, and the dollar is by far the most familiar of all foreign 
currencies in Latin America. 
3.3.5  Remaining Geographic Uncertainties Regarding Currency Location 
Although the teams were not able to visit every country in each region, educated 
guesses were made about dollar usage for several of the unvisited countries by drawing 
on a variety of economic intelligence and information from various businesses and Secret 
Service contacts.  For example, large quantities of dollars clearly seem to be circulating 
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in parts of the former Soviet Union that were not visited such as Estonia, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine; in parts of eastern Europe; and throughout Latin America.  Similarly, 
information obtained by the teams on their visits to South Africa indicates that the dollar 
is the dominant currency used for cross-border trade and tourism throughout Africa. 
Finally, there are strong indications that significant quantities of dollars are used in Cuba. 
In Asia, dollars are used for trade and savings, although gold is also used for savings in 
both Asia and the Middle East.  A substantial quantity of dollars apparently flows into 
and out of China in connection with trading activity with Hong Kong, Russia, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam.  While definitive information on cross-border dollar flows in Asia is 
difficult to obtain, the teams intend to refine their understanding of the magnitude and 
direction of these flows and the related stocks by further ICAP trips to China and the 
Indian subcontinent. 
3.4	 Judging the Plausibility of Overseas Dollar Holdings from 
Country Surveys 
The Federal Reserve estimates that around 60 percent of all U.S. currency, or 
about $365 billion, is held outside the United States.
21  Since each dollar outstanding 
effectively represents an interest-free loan to the U.S. Treasury, the value of the external 
dollar circulation in interest costs avoided is on the order of $14 billion to $16 billion per 
year.
22  As shown in table 1.1 above, the number of dollars in circulation has been 
21For the original analysis on which these estimates are based, see Porter and Judson 
(April and October 1996). Current estimates suggest a range from around 55 to a little 
over 60 percent of banknotes are held abroad. 
22Technically, dollars held abroad do not reduce the level of either Treasury borrowing or 
Treasury interest payments. Rather, by expanding Federal Reserve liabilities (Federal 
Reserve notes outstanding) and, commensurately, Federal Reserve assets (U.S. 
government securities), dollars held abroad increase the quantity of Treasury liabilities 
held by the Federal Reserve and the amount of Treasury interest paid to the Federal 
Reserve. Since, at the margin, all Federal Reserve earnings are returned to the 
Treasury, the effect is that the Treasury avoids paying interest on the value of 
outstanding debt equal to the Federal Reserve notes held outside the country. For 
example, in 2001 the Federal Reserve returned $26.1 billion to the Treasury, the bulk 
of which represented earnings from the assets funded by currency issuance. On the 
bases of our estimate that one-half to two-thirds of U.S. currency is circulating 
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increasing steadily since 1980, and a sizable share of this growth can be attributed to 
overseas demand.  The dollar is thus a valuable export whose quality, or integrity, should 
be protected.  As with many products, users have alternatives; in this case, alternatives 
include the British pound, euro, Swiss franc, Japanese yen, Hong Kong dollar, and 
Singapore dollar. 
How plausible are the estimates that $365 billion of U.S. dollars are held 
overseas? The nature of the aggregate estimate is the subject of the next chapter.  The 
precise amounts that are held abroad have been the subject of a great deal of speculation 
for some time: As early as 1921, as the inflationary implications of the Treaty of 
Versailles were starting to leave an imprint, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
began publishing estimates of currency flows to Europe. 
Table 3.3 presents some preliminary results from the various Treasury and 
Federal Reserve surveys.  As expected, the per capita estimates tend to be higher in 
countries that have experienced high rates of inflation, even when the peak inflation 
experience occurred much earlier.  The estimates suggest that the 2.6 billion residents in 
the thirty-two countries visited held around $95 on average.  Since these countries 
represent about 40 percent of the world’s population and appear to hold around $250 
billion in currency, the countries not yet visited might well hold enough dollars to 
account for overseas holdings in the neighborhood of $365 billion.
23  In particular, table 
3.3 does not include estimates for several countries in Latin America and in the former 
Soviet Union with high dollar usage. 
Thus, the country trips tend to confirm the relatively large estimates of overseas 
currency.  But one substantial area of uncertainty remains.  Domestic survey evidence on 
individual holdings of currency in the United States shows only about 10 percent of the 
total U.S. currency stock as being located inside the United States.
24  If 60 percent or so 
overseas, the marginal value of external dollar circulation can be estimated at $14 
billion to $16 billion. 
23 Per capita holdings in the countries not yet visited would only need to be about $30 to 
be consistent with the overall estimate that 60 percent of U.S. currency is held abroad. 
24Both the direct survey evidence on currency usage in the United States (Porter and 
Judson April 1996) and Sprenkle (1993) argue for a small proportion, around 10 
percent, of U.S. currency being held within the United States. 
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were held abroad, this leaves 30 percent of the currency stock unaccounted for.  The true 
domestic figure is very likely larger than 10 percent, but the possibility that foreign 
holdings are substantially larger than 60 percent cannot be ruled out. 
Table 3.3 
















GDP held in 




Argentina  37.4  3.3  1,300  17.5 
Belarus  3  .4  .6  288  5.8 
Brazil  1  4.5  5.5  6  0.1 
Bulgaria 1  8.3  100.0  120  2.8 
Cambodia  11.2  5.6  179  25.2 
Chile  0.25  .0  .7  16  0.4 
China  1284.3  7.2  39  0.9 
Colombia  2  .6  .7  52  2.4 
Dominican Republic  1.5  8.0  21.3  188  3.9 
Ecuador  1  .2  .3  77  7.3 
Egypt  1  .8  .8  15  0.4 
El  Salvador  1  6  3  152 7.5 
Hong  Kong  2  5  7  308 1.2 
Indonesia  209.8  9.2  10  0.3 
Korea  45.9  6.1  327  2.3 
Latvia .5  2.4  243.6  208  5.5 
Lithuania  3.6  136.5  139  3.6 
Mexico  5  .6  .2  51  0.6 
Panama  2.0  7  0  648  11.1 
Peru  5  .2  .9  182 3.8* 
Paraguay  .1  5.6  16.9  18  0.6 
Philippines  76.1  9.6  26  1.0 
Poland  1  .6  .9  26  0.4 
Romania  2  38.6  134.8  52  0.8 
Russia  80  7.2  3.1  550 10.0* 
Singapore  1  4  3  294 1.4 
South Africa  2  43.6  8.0  46  3.1 
Taiwan  1  21.7  3.2  46  0.3 
Thailand  .25  59.5  5.0  4  0.1 
Turkey  10  .5  .2  157  2.6 
Vietnam  3  .1  .9  40  2.7 
Total  248.1  2628.9 …  … 


























Notes: The source data for the average annual inflation rate is based on monthly IFS data, and, when 
possible, ten-year averages of such data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  The 
remaining data in the table were drawn from the CIA World Factbook website.  For the currency 
holdings, estimates were provided during the teams’ visits to each country, and are thus estimates as of 
the most recent trip to each country.  ICAP teams in the Middle East also found that about $15 billion 
was in the Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq.  A 
similar amount was thought to be in India and Pakistan. 
**Based on purchasing power parity GDP. 
….Not applicable 
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3.5  Changing Conditions in Countries Surveyed 
Conditions in some countries have changed significantly since the last report. 
Argentina experienced a severe crisis from which it has yet to recover and which spread 
into neighboring Uruguay.  Ecuador and El Salvador dollarized.  The precise patterns of 
dollar usage may have changed as a result of these events, but many of the general 
patterns almost surely remain, so the information from the trips is likely to remain 
generally valid.  In addition, the ongoing relationships and visits from residents of these 
countries provide periodic updates. 
3.5.1  Transaction Technologies 
As countries develop and stabilize, noncash transactions and savings mechanisms 
such as checks, credit cards, debit cards, and bank accounts can displace paper currency. 
However, discussions during the teams' trips indicate that people who have been driven 
to dollar usage by crisis are often extremely cautious about moving away from the 
familiar dollar.  At the wholesale level, payment systems that displace dollars are 
embraced when credit systems and contract enforceability are established; these 
developments occur more readily within countries than across borders.  Since the initial 
report, several bold experiments in electronic cash were launched, but none proved to be 
commercially successful. 
3.5.2  Euro Banknote Introduction 
The introduction of the euro banknotes in January 2002 generated a small short-
run increase in demand for dollars, but in the longer run the euro may well displace the 
dollar in some portfolios.  Three groups of people who now use dollars might switch to 
euros at some point.  First, residents of the euro area who currently carry dollars when 
they travel outside their home countries will no longer need dollars within the euro area 
and may be able to exchange euros just as easily and cheaply as dollars outside this area 
to the extent that the euro succeeds as an international currency.
25  These users might 
25 Among other factors, the cost of exchanging money is a function of the volume 
exchanged in a particular currency and location.  Dollars are relatively cheap to 
exchange in many places because they are heavily used. 
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switch to euros fairly quickly, and there are already indications that Europeans and 
Russians moved toward euros for their vacations in 2002.  Second, dollar users in 
countries close to the euro area may find that euros are just as convenient, and in some 
cases more convenient, than dollars.  However, these users might need somewhat more 
time to become accustomed to euros, and thus might not generate large movements to 
euros and away from dollars for several years.  Third, although residents of countries 
experiencing political or economic crisis might in the long run prefer to hold euros, 
second-currency-holding habits change only very slowly.  Thus, this group of dollar users 
is also unlikely to switch away from dollars very soon, if ever.  Overall, current users of 
dollars as a store of wealth will likely be cautious about switching to euros until the euro 
becomes somewhat more established. 
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4  Models of Overseas Currency Demand and Usage 
The Federal Reserve has developed several statistical models for estimating 
stocks and flows of U.S. dollars abroad.
26  The models indicate that between 50 percent 
and 70 percent of U.S. currency is now held outside the United States and that the growth 
in currency in circulation over much of the 1990s has been driven mostly by overseas 
demand.  These models use confidential data on currency shipments to and from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, data collected by the U.S. Customs Service through 
its Currency and Monetary Instrument Report, data on cash processing at Federal Reserve 
Banks, and less formal information collected during the study trips. 
4.1  Data Sources 
4.1.1  Major Wholesale Dealers of Banknotes 
Currently, monthly reports on the volumes, sources, and destinations of incoming 
and outgoing international currency shipments are provided to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York by large commercial banks and other banknote brokers.  These reports have 
been provided since 1988, and were also provided for a period between World War I and 
World War II. 
About $163 billion in U.S. currency on net moved overseas via wholesale 
banknote brokers in the fourteen years from 1988 through 2001.  Before 1992, the bulk of 
the net value went to Latin America, primarily Argentina, which received a little more 
than one-third of total net shipments from the United States to the rest of the world in the 
1988–91 period.  Since then, turbulence in the former Soviet Union has sharply boosted 
shipments, especially to Russia.  Indeed, the shipments have been so large that, for the 
fourteen years from 1988 to 2001, the broad region of Europe, Russia, and the other 
countries of the former Soviet Union has come to account for about nearly all net U.S. 
currency shipments abroad.  This growth was spectacular from 1994 to 1996, when 
26See Porter and Judson (April and October 1996) for a comprehensive treatment of the 
various indirect models that have been developed to estimate overseas holdings. 
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annual net flows to Russia averaged about $20 billion, or well over half of total net 
foreign shipments of U.S. currency in that period. 
4.1.2  Federal Reserve Cash Processing Data 
The most complete source of indirect information on currency flows is data on 
currency processing at the Federal Reserve System's thirty-six Cash Offices.  The Cash 
Offices record by denomination and, to a limited extent, by series, all currency received, 
processed, destroyed, and paid out or shipped to other Cash Offices.  These data do not 
differentiate between foreign and domestic flows, but by comparing Cash Office reports 
on shipments of $100s and $50s with information from other sources, we can enhance 
our knowledge of stocks and flows abroad.  These data are particularly useful in light of 
other data, which indicate that a noteworthy portion of cash activity at certain Cash 
Offices arises from foreign demand for U.S. currency. 
4.1.3  Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports 
The most obvious direct source of information on currency flows across U.S. 
borders is the Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIRs) required by the U.S. 
Customs Service.  In principle, these reports are a rich source of information because 
individuals and firms making almost any shipment of more than $10,000 in cash across a 
U.S. border are required to file a CMIR.  Nonetheless, at least six factors indicate that 
CMIRs are neither accurate nor thorough measures of large cash shipments outside the 
banking sector. 
First, because arriving travelers must pass through Customs but departing 
travelers ordinarily do not, the CMIR data are biased toward measuring inflows of 
currency.  Departing travelers are occasionally informed of the filing requirement or are 
targeted for enforcement purposes, but their responses are not adjusted statistically to 
account for the large proportion of outgoing travelers who should, but apparently do not, 
file CMIRs.  For example, in 1994 the number of travelers entering the United States 
from anywhere in the world was about the same as the number of travelers leaving (about 
30
45 million), but in that year, about 170,000 arriving travelers filed CMIRs, whereas only 
about 34,000 departing travelers did so.
27 
Second, CMIRs do not capture shipments of $10,000 or less, activity that could 
cumulate to a significant total.  This feature of the data collection process biases the 
reported flows particularly for locations near the United States.  Thus, according to the 
CMIR report (as well as wholesale bank shipments data) the net flows between the 
United States and its neighbors in most periods are relatively small and almost uniformly 
one way.  For example, the flows are reported as going from Mexico to the United States 
and not the reverse.  The explanation for these biased reports is simple: The flows to 
Mexico tend to be in numerous but small amounts, often via remittances or in the pockets 
of travelers who individually do not carry that much cash and thus do not need to file or, 
in any event, do not file CMIRs.  In contrast, flows in the opposite direction represent 
that part of the currency going to Mexico that is unneeded and so is returned via 
wholesale banking channels to the United States and recorded in both CMIRs and 
wholesale reports.  These one-way flows from Mexico are quite large, perhaps on the 
order of $600-$800 million per month. 
Third, many shipments greater than $10,000 are likely to be misreported or not 
reported at all.  Although banks and other firms are accustomed to filing CMIRs and 
probably do so fairly diligently, individuals are potentially less aware of these reports, 
less willing to file them, or even eager to avoid them. 
Fourth, the record-keeping system for CMIRs was designed to identify individual 
transactions, not to develop accurate aggregate statistics on currency flows. 
Fifth, the 1996 establishment of the extended custodial inventory (ECI) facilities 
(see chapter 5) provides data superior to those on the CMIRs in two ways: (1) the CMIRs 
do not record the ultimate destination or origin of the currency being shipped, whereas 
27Most likely as a result of this one-sided recording capability, net shipments of U.S. 
currency in the CMIR statistics totaled only $340 million in the period from 1977 to 
1996, a period over which all other estimates of such flows increased by several orders 
of magnitude more. 
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the data on commercial bank shipments do, at least in principle, and (2) Federal Reserve 
data capture all of the movements in and out of the ECIs, whereas the CMIRs do not.
28 
In sum, CMIRs are an important source of data, but they probably do not provide 
accurate aggregate data because of a one-sided system for collecting data, the omission of 
some potentially large volumes of currency flows, and the inability to cope with 
intermediate ECI transactions. 
4.1.4  ICAP Trips and Other Institutional Information 
The Federal Reserve estimates also draw on institutional knowledge of several 
types, most having to do with patterns in the issuance and usage of the $100 note, the 
largest denomination now issued by the Federal Reserve.  Two facts about the use of 
$100s suggest that the net new demand for them is coming primarily from abroad.  First, 
although $20s are in more common use than $100s in the United States, $100s now make 
up nearly 70 percent of the dollar value of all U.S. currency outstanding.  Second, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which is the primary supplier of currency to foreign 
users, makes shipments of $100s that are unusually large relative to its region’s share of 
nationwide population and income (table 4.1).  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
accounted for over a third of the gross issuance of $100s in 2001, a figure two to three 
times larger than its share of population, income, or payments of $20s, a denomination 
more commonly used for domestic transactions.
29  At the same time, survey data on 
holdings of the $100 bill indicate that U.S. residents hold, on average, less than one-third 
of a single bill per person, while for every U.S. resident, about twelve $100 notes now 
circulate somewhere in the world.  In sum, the basic information we have from surveys 
and the Federal Reserve Cash Offices about the circulation of $100 notes is consistent 
with relatively low dollar use domestically and high use abroad. 
28The CMIRs capture only the initial and final transactions in the circular flow of 
currency from and to the United States. The Federal Reserve data capture all 
intermediate cases when the fit currency returns to the ECI. 
29 The figures for the period 1974-2001 overall are quite similar. 
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4.2	 Methods for Measuring Flows and Stocks of U.S. Currency 
Abroad 
In terms of the geographic split in holdings, it is unwise to rely exclusively on 
official data sources because they often miss significant currency flows.  For example, 
between two countries, currency often flows in one direction in the hands of travelers and 
in the other direction through (recorded) wholesale shipments between banks. 
4.2.1  The Seasonal Method 
The seasonal method, as well as various other indirect methods discussed in 
Porter and Judson (April and October 1996), is based on the idea that the usage of U.S. 
currency abroad differs from its usage in the United States in some measurable respect. 
The method relies on three assumptions: (1) the seasonal pattern of currency demand in 
the United States is the same as the seasonal pattern observed for demand in Canada, (2) 
foreign demand for U.S. dollars has no seasonal pattern, and (3) international demand for 
Canada’s currency is so small that the seasonal pattern of demand for Canadian currency 
is a domestic phenomenon.  Appendix 1.1 in the previous report provides evidence of the 
veracity of these assumptions and details about the model.  The seasonal method 
produces an estimate of the share of currency held abroad that rises steadily from about 
35 percent in the early 1960s to around 68 percent in the early 1990s and remains flat at 
this share before tailing off a bit and reaching around 61 percent by 2002.
30 
30These estimates are based on the banknote denominations common to the two countries, 
namely the $5, $10, $20, $50,  $100, and $1000 notes. The results reported are a dollar 
share weighted average of those for the individual denominations, with the highest two 
denominations combined into one to take account of the continued issue and use of 
$1000s in Canada until recently. In September 1998, $1000s in Canada made up about 
12 percent of the value of Canadian notes in circulation.  The issuance of $1000 notes 
in Canada has been discontinued, and they now comprise less than 6 percent of the 
value of notes in circulation. To replace many of the $1000s that were removed from 
circulation, a disproportionately larger number of $100s were subsequently issued. To 
avoid the possible distortions in the seasonal estimates for $100s, a combined estimate 
of $100s and $1000s was constructed. 
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 Figure 4.1 

U.S. Currency Abroad, Estimated by the Seasonal Method, 

Denominations from $5 to $1000 

Percent Abroad 
4.2.2  The Biometric Method 
The second estimation method is based on an approach used by biologists to 
estimate the size of an animal population.  Biologists, like bankers, can often only see a 
small part of the “population” (animals or pieces of currency) at any one time.  The 
approach used by biologists is to capture a sample of the animals, mark them, release 
them, and capture another sample later.
31  Assuming that the marks do not affect the 
animals' ability to survive, the share of marked animals in the (unknown) general 
population will be the same as the share of marked animals in the recaptured sample.  For 
example, suppose that a biologist wants to estimate the number of fish in a pond.  The 
biologist catches 100 fish and marks them.  Later, the biologist returns and catches 
31This approach draws on studies in the 1890s by a Danish biologist, Carl Petersen.  More 
detail about the model can be found in appendix A.1.2 of the previous report, and in 
Porter and Judson (1996). 
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another 100 fish, of which 20 fish have the biologist's mark on them.  This would suggest 
that 20 out of 100 of the total fish population, or 20 percent, are marked.  Since the 
biologist knows that 100 of the fish are marked, the biologist might conclude that 100 is 
20 percent of the total population, or that the population is 500. 
This approach can be adapted to measuring U.S. currency abroad by combining 
two kinds of information: (1) data from Federal Reserve Cash Offices on currency 
shipped to and from local banks, and (2) knowledge that most of the $100 shipments 
handled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are to and from foreign banks.  First, 
data on currency flows at Federal Reserve Cash Offices provide virtually continuous 
“samples” of currency.  Although currency is not literally marked when it is processed at 
Federal Reserve Banks, statistics for the pre-1990-series $100 note are maintained 
separately from those for the 1990 and NCD series.  The 1990-series note contains an 
embedded security thread; the NCD note has additional security features, including an 
enlarged offset portrait, a watermark, and color-shifting ink.  The 1990-series and NCD 
notes function as the marked animals.  For example, when a pre-NCD note is “sampled,” 
or returned to a Federal Reserve Cash Office, it is “marked” by being replaced with a 
NCD note.  We know the number of NCD notes issued by each Federal Reserve Cash 
Office, and we know how many return to the Cash Offices in later samples. 
Second, we make use of the institutional fact that the $100 shipments moving 
through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are mostly to and from foreign banks, 
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York handles most international shipments 
between commercial banks and the Federal Reserve.  Thus, if we can estimate the 
population of dollars in the area served by each Federal Reserve Bank, the currency 
abroad can be estimated as the population in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York area. 
Using the biometric method, we find that the December 2001 share of $100s held abroad 
is just under 70 percent.  The comparable estimate for $50s is about 52 percent.  For 
$20s, the NCD processing strategy, which was to not immediately destroy all old-design 
notes processed, makes it difficult or impossible to apply the biometric method. 
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4.2.3  Wholesale Demand for Currency 
The Flow of Funds Section of the Federal Reserve Board and the Commerce 
Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) jointly publish quarterly estimates of 
international currency holdings that proxy for wholesale shipments of U.S. currency 
(table 1.1, column 4).
32  The published series represents an estimate of wholesale 
currency shipments that move through the international banking system.  Research by 
Porter and Judson (April 1996) showed that such shipments constitute the vast majority 
of all international currency shipments, with a relatively minor amount likely being 
transmitted through the hands of individuals and firms and smaller financial institutions. 
The Federal Reserve-BEA estimate can be viewed in several different ways. 
First, as a benchmark for the amount of $100s held overseas in the last few years, this 
estimate closely matches the other estimates of the percentage of $100s held abroad.  The 
Federal Reserve-BEA estimate of the share of $100s held outside the United States was 
66.4 percent of total $100s in circulation at the end of 2001, which is very close to the 
estimates for this period obtained from the two methods discussed above, the seasonal 
(65.6 percent) and the biometric (68.8 percent).
33  Second, apart from these institutional 
considerations, the Federal Reserve-BEA estimates can be considered to represent 
international flows because they also coincide with the outliers from a simple domestic 
money demand specification.  Table 4.1 shows that, in 2001, gross payments of $100s 
and $20s from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis were 3.0 percent and 3.2 percent 
respectively, roughly in line with the district’s 1998 share of personal income of 3.5 
percent.
34  Thus, the amount of $100s in this District appears to be in line with what 
might be expected from domestic money demand considerations within the District—that 
is, by and large, the $100s that were issued in this District appear to have been used there. 
32The Federal Reserve began publication in December 1996 and the BEA in July 1997, 
and in each case both levels and net flows are published.  Earlier, the BEA published a 
similar concept but that series was discontinued in the mid-1950s. 
33 This central tendency, 68.8 percent, for the biometric estimate combines the three 
methods that appear to be converging at the end of the sample.  Based on past 
experience with this estimator, we believe that the excluded estimate will also 
eventually converge to the other estimates, so we discard it from consideration here. 
34 Figures for the period 1974-2001 as a whole are very similar. 
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The same alignment with local demand variables does not hold for the New York 
District, which includes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: during 2001, the New 
York District issued 34.4 percent of all $100s but only 14.3 percent of all $20s. 
Table 4.1 





1  Personal 
income
2  $100s issued
3 $20s  issued
3 
Boston  4.5  7.2 
New  York  11.4  14.3 
Philadelphia  4.4  7.2 
Cleveland 6.8  5.1 
Richmond  8.6  11.4 
Atlanta  13.0  12.9 
Chicago  10.9 6.6  11.9 
St.  Louis  3.5  3.2 
Minneapolis  2.0  2.1 
Kansas  City  4.9  4.0 
Dallas  8.7  6.3 
San  Francisco  21.6  14.5 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Population
2.8  5.0 
34.4  13.8 
3.4  4.6 
2.4  6.4 
7.3  8.5 
12.8  11.8 
10.7 
3.0  3.3 
1.2  2.0 
2.9  4.6 
6.7  8.0 
16.5  21.0 
100.0  100.0 
1. As of 1998. 
2. Total personal income in 1998. 
3. Gross payments in 2001. 
If the population served by each Cash Office is used as the benchmark for the 
normal level of demand in that region, the two significant outliers are the New York and 
Los Angeles Cash Offices.
35  That finding was the deciding reason for selecting these two 
offices in constructing the Federal Reserve-BEA wholesale estimate.  The assumption 
that all $100s issued by these two offices are sent abroad or received from abroad 
requires that the quantity of small-denomination notes sent abroad from these two offices 
as part of wholesale shipments about matches, on net, the $100s used domestically in the 
regions served by these offices. 
Unfortunately, this analysis cannot readily be applied to lower denominations. 
For denominations lower than $100, notably the $20, which is the next most widely used 
35 The Los Angeles Cash Office is part of the San Francisco District.  The Los Angeles 
office shows atypically large inflows of $100s, which is largely currency returned to 
the U.S. from Pacific Rim countries. 
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note, the estimates are far less clear-cut.  In part, the variation in the quality of the results 
for these two denominations represents differences in the way these two notes are used. 
The $20 is a popular denomination in some developing countries such as Mexico and 
other nearby Latin American countries, most likely because its purchasing power is 
convenient for a wide array of transactions.  Various indirect methods for estimating 
overseas holdings suggest that the proportion of $20s held overseas is more than half. 
But because the $20 seems to be more likely to circulate outside of recorded commercial 
banking channels, the data on wholesale shipments that allow confirming estimates for 
the $100 are much less informative for the $20, for two reasons.  First, for a given dollar 
value, $20s are more numerous and hence more expensive to ship than $100s.  Indeed, 
data indicate that, unlike the $100, only a tiny fraction of the $20s that are paid into 
circulation are shipped overseas.  Second, anecdotal information indicates that departing 
international travelers are far more likely to carry $20s than $100s simply because the 
$20 is the primary denomination dispensed from ATMs within the United States.  In sum, 
while various indirect methods for estimating overseas currency holdings suggest that 
more than half of $20s are overseas, the direct evidence is scanty but perhaps suggestive 
of a significantly lower figure. 
4.2.4  Summary: Reconciling the Estimates from the Various Methods 
It is interesting and reassuring to note that these disparate methods yield very 
similar quantitative results, especially for the key $100 denomination, which accounted 
for nearly 70 percent of the total value of U.S. banknotes at the end of 2001.  The 
biometric method produces an estimate of 68.8 percent abroad, a value close to the 
seasonal method’s estimate of 65.6 percent abroad.  These two estimates in turn are 
within a few percentage points of the wholesale demand method’s estimate, which is that 
66.4 percent of $100s were abroad at the end of 2001.  For $50s, the seasonal method 
estimate (64.4 percent held abroad) and the biometric method estimate (52.3 percent held 
abroad) agree less closely, but are both between half and two-thirds.  It is difficult to 
comment on $20s as their introduction was handled differently and in a way that was not 
conducive to applying the biometric model to the available processing data. 
38
5  The International Distribution of U.S. Banknotes 
The current program and the earlier JIST efforts were undertaken to further 
understanding of currency movements both within and outside commercial banking 
channels, which include local retail banks and banks that function as major wholesale 
banknote dealers.  Currency movements within banking channels include sales and 
purchases of currency to and from the public and banks, and can be partially measured 
and observed since the Federal Reserve is the ultimate source or destination for many 
banknote shipments.  A significant volume of currency also moves across borders outside 
banking channels, in the pockets and suitcases of travelers and traders; these movements 
are extremely difficult to measure, even in approximate terms. 
5.1  International U.S. Banknote Market Structure 
Like other financial instruments, U.S. banknotes are traded internationally with 
small bid-ask spreads.  While many financial institutions trade U.S. dollars for other 
currencies in the international foreign exchange markets, no more than thirty institutions 
worldwide participate actively in the wholesale buying and selling (including transport 
and delivery) of physical U.S. banknotes.
36  Wholesale dealer banks purchase 
approximately 90 percent of the U.S. dollars that are exported to international markets 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  Most of the remaining purchases are 
distributed from the offices of the Federal Reserve Banks of San Francisco and Atlanta. 
Wholesalers purchase banknotes to fill customer orders and the notes are shipped either 
directly to the customer overseas or to distribution centers.  In value terms, approximately 
85 percent of U.S. banknotes that wholesale dealing banks purchase in the markets and 
return to the United States are deposited for processing at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York; most of the remaining repatriated notes are deposited at the Federal Reserve 
Banks of San Francisco, Dallas, and Atlanta. 
Worldwide, six locations serve as the principal international distribution and 
consolidation hubs for U.S. banknotes: one in the western Hemisphere (Buenos Aires), 
36 This group of wholesalers includes those who are active globally as well as those who 
trade only in regional markets. 
39
three in western Europe (Frankfurt, London, and Zurich), and two in off-shore Asian 
centers (Hong Kong and Singapore).  Five of these sites have traditionally been 
extremely active in the U.S. banknote business.  Frankfurt became a major U.S. banknote 
hub as a result of the growth of the Russian markets in the early 1990s.  The preeminence 
of all these locations arises from their accessible transportation networks as well as their 
historical focus on international commerce. 
U.S. banknotes are distributed over international wholesale channels either as new 
notes (bundled in plastic wrappers from the BEP), which is the preferred form for the 
majority of international market participants, or as fit notes (recirculated banknotes) in 
very good condition.  The overwhelming preference is for new notes, still in their original 
BEP packaging, which assures that the notes are free of counterfeits. 
In view of the handling costs and the concern of many purchasers about 
counterfeits, not all of the U.S. banknote distributors are willing to deal with second-hand 
notes.  While a used or “redirect market” does exist, only the highest quality used notes 
are deemed acceptable.  Although not a great deal of information is available about the 
size or velocity of U.S. banknote transactions in the “redirect” segment of the 
international market, it appears that the primary economic justification for dealing 
exclusively with new notes is to avoid the sizable costs incurred in fitness sorting and 
authentication of used notes.  The reluctance of many banknote dealers to participate in 
the redirect market also stems from concerns relating to the authentication of the 
banknotes.  This apprehension is especially true in markets such as Russia, where a $100 
U.S. note is viewed as a significant amount of money and, therefore, the possession of a 
counterfeit $100 U.S. note may represent a major potential loss to an individual. 
5.2  The Extended Custodial Inventory Program 
To aid in the introduction of the $100 new currency design (NCD) note in 1996, 
and in recognition that an assured supply of U.S. currency abroad would help to maintain 
stability in international financial markets, the Federal Reserve introduced the Extended 
Custodial Inventory (ECI) program as a pilot.  An ECI is an overseas cash depot 
maintained by a private-sector bank that holds currency for the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York on a custodial basis in a segregated area of its vaults.  The Federal Reserve 
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Bank of New York manages the ECI program and bears the costs associated with 
providing management oversight and monitoring the program.  It coordinates the 
shipment and receipt of currency between Federal Reserve facilities and the ECIs.  All 
banknotes, while in inventory at an ECI and during transit between a Federal Reserve 
facility and an ECI, are carried on the books of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Each wholesale dealer bank that enters into an ECI arrangement maintains an account at a 
Federal Reserve Bank.  That account is debited whenever the bank sells banknotes and 
the banknotes are paid out of the ECI inventory to its overseas customers.  Conversely, 
that account is credited when the bank purchases currency from its overseas customers 
and deposits it into the ECI inventory. 
Banks that operate ECI sites bear the costs for insurance coverage that is required 
and for staffing the ECI site, maintaining processing operations, and making the 
necessary physical renovations to house the ECI.  The banks must certify that any savings 
realized from the Federal Reserve’s recording ECI transaction on a same-day settlement 
basis will be passed along to the market. 
The inventories held in ECIs enable overseas banks and banknote dealers to draw 
on an immediate supply of U.S. currency to meet local demands as well as to mitigate 
financial crises when unexpected financial or political disturbances occur.  Also, by 
having readily available supplies of U.S. currency at overseas ECIs, market participants 
are not subject to the vagaries of transoceanic transportation schedules or adverse weather 
conditions for filling orders. 
5.2.1  The ECI Pilot Program 
The ECI pilot program had several objectives: to facilitate the introduction of the 
new-design currency, to expedite the repatriation of the old-design banknotes, to promote 
the recirculation of fit new-design currency, and to strengthen U.S. information-gathering 
capabilities on the international use of U.S. currency and sources of U.S. banknote 
counterfeiting abroad.  These objectives were to be accomplished by (1) the strategic 
stockpiling of new-design notes at ECI sites (two in London and one each in Frankfurt 
and Zurich), (2) the implementation of sorting requirements for new- versus old-design 
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notes, (3) the deposit of old-design notes at a Federal Reserve facility, and (4) the 
redistribution of the resulting fit new currency to the international market. 
The pilot program accomplished its primary mission of ensuring “orderly 
markets” during the introduction of the new-design $100 banknote, particularly in the 
European and former Soviet Union markets, by providing ready supplies of new $100 
banknotes.  The pilot program also offered an incentive for the major market participants 
to take an active role in the introduction of the new-design currency and the repatriation 
of the old-design notes derived from their on-site control of the inventories that were 
carried on the books of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  Despite additional 
expenses incurred by the pilot program participants, competition increased and currency 
pricing margins substantially narrowed because of the cost savings from bulk currency 
shipments. 
Federal Reserve economists evaluated the implicit costs and benefits of the ECI 
program to the U.S. Treasury and concluded that the implicit cost of the program is small 
compared with the benefit of potential additional seigniorage that might occur as a result 
of increased overseas traffic in U.S. currency.  The cost is even less significant when 
viewed in light of continued confidence in the large stock of U.S. currency held abroad. 
Even though the exact amount cannot easily be determined, it does appear that the ECI 
program results in a net gain to the U.S. Treasury.  Finally, the pilot provided important 
new information on the international flows of U.S. currency, both genuine and 
counterfeit, which is critical to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Secret Service. 
In summary, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s ECI pilot represented a 
successful new approach in the Federal Reserve System’s currency distribution and 
processing policies.  It demonstrated that partnership with the private sector can 
supplement Reserve Bank capabilities and be a cost-effective and market-sensitive 
approach. 
5.2.2  The Current ECI Program 
After the successful introduction of the NCD series notes, the ECI program’s 
purpose was shifted from introducing new currency designs to enhancing the 
international banknote distribution system and ensuring the integrity of U.S. currency. 
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The planned introduction of another new-design note series will once again put the ECI 
operations in a central role in facilitating the introduction and in conducting the public 
education campaign. 
In January 1998 the ECI program was placed into full operation with the 
European ECI program extended through 2000.  Additionally, ECI operations were 
established in Hong Kong in 1998, in Buenos Aires in 1999, and in Europe again in 
2000.
37  The Asian ECI program was renewed in 2002 and expanded to Singapore. 
5.2.3  ECI Accomplishments 
The ECI program has significantly facilitated the international distribution of U.S. 
currency by maintaining sufficient stocks of currency in strategically located international 
distribution centers.  In addition, the ECIs were also essential to the Federal Reserve 
System’s efforts to supply currency to the major global financial markets during times of 
crises.  Having the ECI inventories as part of the Federal Reserve’s preparations for the 
century-date change helped assuage currency-related Y2K concerns.  In addition, when 
air transportation was halted after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the 
insurance and armored carrier industries faced significant challenges and promptly 
reassessed their risk exposures.  As air traffic resumed, major delays and flight 
restrictions were nonetheless imposed on freight and valuables cargo.  By having U.S. 
currency already positioned at the ECIs, the Federal Reserve was able to satisfy 
heightened international demands for U.S. currency in the major financial markets 
without any interruption of service. 
The ECI program has been an effective means of repatriating pre-NCD design 
$50 and $100 banknotes.  ECIs are required to sort the currency purchased from market 
participants by design (pre-NCD or NCD) and into fit and unfit notes.  This requirement 
ensures that old and unfit notes are removed from circulation in a timely fashion and then 
sent to a Federal Reserve cash-processing center for authentication and destruction. 
Thus, the ECIs help flush older-design notes out of the international marketplace, further 
ensuring the integrity of U.S. currency outside the country. 
37 The ECI in Buenos Aires was suspended in February 2002 because of unstable 
economic and political conditions in Argentina. 
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The ECI program has been a major contributor in the effort to retire old series 
designs, which has been successful.  This success is based upon a combination of factors: 
a higher penetration rate for the new design in various markets based upon the much 
more significant changes in the design; the associated improvements in counterfeit 
deterrence; a more effective public education campaign; the development of an 
international market for fit notes as well as the requirement for ECIs to repatriate old 
design notes. 
Banknote dealers in the international currency markets voluntarily provide data to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on country-level flows of payments and receipts. 
This dataset has been instrumental in the creation of several statistical models for 
estimating stocks and flows of U.S. currency abroad.  These models in turn, have been 
used to gain a better understanding of the benefits and challenges that result from having 
about $365 billion of U.S. currency held abroad.  The ECI program has enabled the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to provide the U.S. Treasury Department and Board 
of Governors with timelier and more detailed reporting of country-specific information 
on overseas use of U.S. currency. 
The sorting and authentication operations conducted by the ECIs and the 
information provided to the U.S. Secret Service and Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
are important aspects of anti-counterfeiting efforts, and provide two concrete 
improvements in reporting.  First, the ECI program has become a direct source of 
information to the U.S. Secret Service on international counterfeiting.  All ECIs utilize 
the Secret Service’s web-based Counterfeit Note Search Site.  ECIs detect counterfeit 
notes before they pass from the overseas banking system and information on the 
geographic sources of these counterfeit deposits is quickly relayed to the Secret Service. 
The ECIs were among the pilot sites for the Secret Service web-based automated 
counterfeit note search site.  Second, most notes forwarded to Federal Reserve Banks are 
labeled by country of origin.  Thus, the origin of counterfeits detected in ECI shipments 
to Federal Reserve Banks can be determined and is now reported. 
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6  Global Counterfeiting 
Given that so much genuine U.S. currency is overseas, a reasonable question is 
how much counterfeit U.S. currency might also be circulating overseas?  When the ICAP 
teams were initially assembled in the mid-1990s, numerous reports suggested that vast 
quantities of counterfeit dollars were circulating overseas.  Some of these reports and 
anecdotes came from commercial establishments seeking to sell their anti-counterfeiting 
products as a method for businesses to protect themselves.  Other, more credible 
organizations stated that vast amounts of counterfeit notes went undetected and remained 
in the marketplace indefinitely.  All such reports and anecdotes have been refuted by the 
findings of the ICAP trips as well as by data from official sources, an indication that the 
actual incidence of counterfeiting is relatively low.  This chapter examines the economics 
of counterfeiting, the mechanics of counterfeiting enforcement, the amount of 
counterfeits that have been passed and seized in various international markets, and the 
efforts by the Secret Service to respond to various counterfeiting threats.  Chapter 6 
attempts to place an upper bound on the estimated quantity of counterfeit currency in 
circulation using data collected by the Secret Service and Federal Reserve and an analysis 
of circulation patterns for genuine and counterfeit currency. 
6.1  General Considerations 
Counterfeiting of U.S. currency is a lucrative and relatively low-risk criminal 
enterprise in many parts of the world.  Since U.S. dollars are widely held and used in 
many countries, counterfeiters have many opportunities to pass counterfeit dollars outside 
of the United States.  Moreover, the punishment for production, distribution, and passing 
of counterfeit U.S. dollars outside the United States varies considerably in severity.  The 
level of concern about counterfeiting also varied across the countries visited by the 
teams: Officials and business people in some countries viewed counterfeits as a 
considerable threat while those in other countries were more blasé, viewing counterfeits 
as an inescapable part of the banknote business.  Regardless of the level of concern, the 
figures for the incidence of counterfeiting were remarkably consistent: Most central 
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banks report detecting no more than about one counterfeit note for every 10,000 notes 
they handle. 
Detection capabilities for counterfeit U.S. dollars are relatively high overseas and, 
in line with the idea that counterfeit notes are part of the banknote business, the level of 
resources expended on their detection is determined in cost-benefit terms.  That is, both 
central and commercial banks displayed varying detection practices depending on local 
labor costs, local counterfeit activity, and the relative cost of missing a counterfeit. 
Training tellers to detect counterfeit U.S. dollars is not particularly difficult, and it is 
possible to find and train fully capable tellers in emerging-market countries.  In many 
countries, tellers have an incentive to detect counterfeit U.S. dollars because the value of 
undetected counterfeit notes is frequently deducted from their pay.  The incentives for 
shopkeepers are similar: Accepting a counterfeit is likely to result in a direct loss to the 
business.  In countries where dollars are a new asset, small commercial banks might 
suffer a loss from counterfeiting and then arrange for training to avoid further episodes. 
Similarly, banks often sort lower-denomination notes only by machine or not at all, 
reserving the costly but more accurate method of hand counting and verification for the 
$50 and $100 denominations.  On balance, counterfeit U.S. dollars were typically viewed 
as an occasional but not serious problem within the foreign banking community. 
In the United States, U.S. dollars sent to Federal Reserve Banks are checked for 
counterfeits, and any counterfeits detected are forwarded to the Secret Service for further 
investigation.  The counterfeits detected by the Federal Reserve constitute about 20 
percent of all counterfeit passed upon the public and received by the Secret Service.  The 
remaining 80 percent of counterfeit U.S. dollars detected are reported to the Secret 
Service directly by commercial establishments, financial institutions, and law 
enforcement authorities. 
The Secret Service has recently developed two new systems to improve statistical 
reporting: The Counterfeit Contraband System and the new Counterfeit Note Search Site 
on the Internet.  The Counterfeit Contraband System automates the collection of 
statistical and investigative data regarding counterfeit currency.  Information entered into 
the system is readily available for analysis and is reconciled fifteen days after the end of 
each month.  The system allows each Secret Service office to monitor the data of all other 
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offices to determine if and when counterfeiting activity moves from one investigative 
district to another.  Monthly records are closed on the fifteenth of the following month, 
allowing for timely access to current statistics. 
In March 1999 the Secret Service established a Counterfeit Note Search Site on 
the Internet (www.usdollars.treas.gov) that allows authorized users to access a database 
containing descriptions of all counterfeit notes known to the Secret Service.  This web 
site, which is in continuous operation, allows domestic and foreign financial institutions 
and law enforcement agencies to input the identifiers on a questioned note to determine if 
it is a known counterfeit.  If the note is a known counterfeit, the Secret Service 
classification number is given, and further instructions are provided.  If the note is not a 
known counterfeit, the user is instructed to carefully examine the note for defects and to 
call the Secret Service office listed on the screen for additional assistance.  This site 
allows the Secret Service to obtain information on counterfeit distribution and passing 
activity more quickly than in the past. 
The Secret Service Counterfeit Division, which is the headquarters unit with 
oversight of all Secret Service anti-counterfeiting operations, controls access to the web 
site and maintains the counterfeit note database.  The Counterfeit Division has used the 
web site on several occasions to post limited defect information on certain high-quality 
and large-quantity counterfeit notes to foreign law enforcement and financial institutions 
and the Federal Reserve system, thereby heightening awareness internationally of the 
appearance of these notes.  The Secret Service has received a strongly positive response 
from the international community regarding the U.S. government’s willingness and 
ability to share this information in such a timely manner. 
In addition to providing for the routine processing of counterfeit U.S. dollar notes, 
the web site has been effectively used as a proactive enforcement tool.  Certain high-
priority notes, such as notes targeted in a specific investigation, can be carefully 
monitored by Counterfeit Division.  When a user anywhere in the world enters the 
identifiers on these notes, this information can be rapidly disseminated to the responsible 
Secret Service Field Office and other authorities for immediate investigative action. 
Over time, the Secret Service expects additional foreign banks and law 
enforcement agencies to use the system, thus incorporating more timely and complete 
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information from a wider array of countries.  The web site currently has over 6,000 
subscribers in 68 countries, including a variety of law enforcement agencies, financial 








Type of user  Domestic  International 
Financial  138 
Law enforcement  743  279 
Commercial  4 






In August 2002, the U.S. Secret Service and Colombian National Police 
sponsored an International Counterfeit Money Seminar “A Latin American Perspective 
on the U.S. Dollar” in Bogotá, Colombia, and a Spanish version of the counterfeit note 
search website was introduced to the conference participants, who represented seventeen 
Central and South American countries.  A total of forty-seven individuals registered for 
access to the web site at the seminar.  Both this strong reception for the website, which 
represented nearly 10 percent of international registration on the website as a whole, and 
the plaudits for the Spanish version of the web site garnered at the seminar suggest that 
the site may prove to be a valuable law enforcement tool in this vital region that has been 
the source of so many well-produced counterfeits for a long period of time. 
6.2  Counterfeit Production Methods 
A variety of methods, generating a wide range of quality in output, are currently 
used for producing counterfeit U.S. dollars.  Once produced, the counterfeit U.S. dollars 
must either be passed by the manufacturer or transferred to others for distribution; either 
method is a complicated undertaking when large volumes of notes are produced.  A bank 
or an individual might be fooled into accepting a batch of counterfeit U.S. dollars, but 
this seldom happens more than once.  Thus, the counterfeiter must distribute the bogus 
notes ever more widely. 
38 The figure for number of subscribers was as of August 2002. 
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In the past, producing highly deceptive or easily passed counterfeit U.S. dollars 
required substantial technical ability and access to presses, inks, and, critically, high-
grade paper.  With the current revolution in personal computing and other digital 
technology, printing technology is improving at a dramatic rate, thus reducing the costs 
and printing skills or special training needed for counterfeiting.  As a result, increasingly 
deceptive counterfeit U.S. dollars can be produced on color copiers or on inexpensive 
personal computer equipment. 
Counterfeit U.S. dollar manufacturing operations are of three basic types: 
traditional offset-printed counterfeit notes, digitally printed notes, and more highly 
deceptive notes produced by intaglio and typographic printing methods. 
Traditional offset lithography requires specialized printing equipment and 
materials as well as considerable skill.  The counterfeit U.S. dollars produced by this 
method can be quite deceptive to the public but are generally easy to detect by trained 
cash handling personnel.  The high volume of counterfeit U.S. dollars that can be easily 
produced by this method presents an investigative challenge to foreign and domestic law 
enforcement. 
Digital printing techniques employ copying machines, scanners, and computers, 
which reproduce currency images using multicolor plastic toners or liquid inks.  These 
notes vary greatly in quality.  A layperson with only rudimentary computer skills can use 
digital technology to produce a reasonably “passable” counterfeit note.  Digital 
technology is also poised to revolutionize traditional printing operations.  Fully 
automated and computer controlled offset presses and other specialized printing 
equipment being introduced in today’s market are allowing high-quality and high-volume 
printing with little training or expertise. 
The Secret Service suspects that the counterfeiting of U.S. currency may become 
progressively easier as the generally available technology improves and the cost of 
computer equipment (including printers and scanners) decreases.  Counterfeiting with 
laser color printers is likely to increase with the affordability of the printers.  Similarly, 
the growing use of the Internet is expected to aid counterfeiting.  Once a currency note is 
scanned and the resulting electronic image is enhanced, the image can be transmitted 
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electronically, including over the Internet, and printed in batches of any size by 
individuals who would be unable to make the image themselves. 
Finally, certain highly deceptive notes, termed “supernotes” or “super dollars” by 
the media, have received worldwide attention.  These notes are printed with intaglio and 
typographic methods similar to those used by the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing 
(BEP) and use specially manufactured paper.  Despite the high quality of this type of 
counterfeit, defects and other features allow it to be consistently detected in currency 
processing at Federal Reserve Banks and other financial institutions worldwide.  In 
addition, in terms of volume and overall impact, the current threat from this type of 
counterfeit is greatly overshadowed by the threat from offset and digital counterfeiting. 
Nonetheless, the Secret Service continues to aggressively investigate all cases of “highly 
deceptive” counterfeit U.S. dollars to prevent direct economic loss and a loss in 
confidence in U.S. currency worldwide. 
Of the 651 counterfeit-currency printing operations suppressed in the United 
States during fiscal year 2001, 608, or 93.4 percent, used digital processes, a phenomenal 
increase from the 29 digital operations (or 18.9 percent of the total) suppressed in FY 
1995.  Even though the quality of digital counterfeits varies widely, and even though they 
are not at present being produced outside of the United States in nearly the same volume 
as they are domestically, the increasing use of computers in the production of counterfeit 
notes remains a key concern for the U.S. Secret Service. 
6.3  Recent Experience with Counterfeiting 
Out of the approximately $600 billion in U.S. dollars in circulation during FY 
2001, the Secret Service reported that about $49 million in counterfeit currency was 
passed on to the public worldwide, or about $1 for every $12,400 in circulation.
39  Of that 
$49 million, almost all ($47.5 million) was passed in the United States, with the 
remainder passed overseas.  In terms of enforcement, the Secret Service counterfeit 
39 The Secret Service reported that additional quantities were “seized,” or confiscated 
before they entered circulation.  While seized notes pose some threat before they are 
seized, passed notes clearly cause losses to the public. 
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program in FY 2001 resulted in the arrest of 5,241 suspects and the suppression of 651 
counterfeiting plants in the United States. 
6.3.1  Overall Figures on Passing and Seizures of Counterfeit U.S. Currency 
Within the United States, all detected counterfeit currency must be turned over to 
the Secret Service.  As mentioned earlier, the laws of other countries vary considerably. 
Thus, the Secret Service’s data for the United States are much more complete than the 
equivalent data for other countries.  Table 6.2 displays figures on counterfeit currency 
passed or seized from 1999 to 2002. 
Table 6.2 

Data on Counterfeit Currency, Fiscal Years 1999-2002 

Millions of dollars 
Passed 
Year  Domestic  Total Domestic Foreign  Total 
1999  1.4  40.6  13.7  126.6  140.3 
2000  1.4  41.1  20.9  190.8  211.7 
2001  47.5  1.5  49.0  12.6  54.0  66.6 






Note.  “Seized” refers to counterfeit currency that was detected before being 
circulated, while “passed” indicates currency that was determined to be 
counterfeit after entering circulation.  Only passed currency represents a loss 
to the public; seized counterfeits represent only a potential threat. 
Table 6.3 







Value of counterfeits 
detected 





$1  11,931.0  0.01  0.7 
$2  18.1  0.00  1.1 
$5  2,421.5  0.05  4.2 
$10  2,196.7  0.25  11.6 
$20  14,804.5  1.39  4.7 
$50  1,209.3  0.31  5.1 
$100  1627.0  5.00  30.7 
Total  7.01  5.0  34,208.1 
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6.3.2  Rates of Counterfeiting in Federal Reserve Statistics 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide some evidence on the frequency with which 
counterfeit notes are found in domestic and foreign deposits at Federal Reserve Banks. 
Table 6.3 shows the overall results by denomination for 2002; the denomination with the 
largest amount of counterfeits, both in dollar terms (about $7½ million) and as a 
proportion of notes processed (about 50 per million notes), was the $100 note. 
Table 6.4 







(millions of dollars) 
Notes processed 
(billions of dollars) 
Total  Domestic  Foreign  Total  Domestic  Foreign 
Counterfeits detected per 
million notes of same 
source and series processed 


















6.83  5.69  1.14  112.9  79.8  33.1  60.5  71.3  34.5 
7.22  5.63  1.59  108.3  76.1  32.2  66.7  74.0  49.4 
6.33  5.21  1.11  107.5  76.8  30.7  58.8  67.8  36.3 
5.82  5.00  0.82  111.7  84.3  27.5  52.1  59.3  29.8 
6.44  5.56  0.89  162.1  124.4  37.7  39.8  44.7  23.5 
7.40  6.63  0.77  154.0  126.7  27.3  48.1  52.4  28.1 
5.00  4.27  0.73  162.7  127.1  35.6  30.7  33.6  20.4 


















0.02  0.02  0.00  23.9  0.8 
0.50  0.47  0.03  65.8  7.6 
1.58  1.48  0.10  83.2  19.0 
2.59  2.40  0.19  95.5  27.1 
3.89  3.49  0.41  143.8  27.1 
4.92  4.50  0.42  141.6  34.8 




17.09  15.50  1.60  708.8  17.5 
Pre-NCD Series 
1996 6.81  5.67  1.14  88.9  76.6 
1997 6.72  5.16  1.56  42.6  158.0 
1998 4.75  3.73  1.01  24.3  195.2 
1999 3.23  2.60  0.63  16.2  199.5 
2000 2.55  2.07  0.48  18.2  139.8 
2001 2.48  2.13  0.35  12.4  200.3 




Total, 1996-2002  27.95  22.49  5.45  210.3  144.1 
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6.3.3  Counterfeiting Inside and Outside the United States 
Table 6.4 breaks down the data for $100s detected at Federal Reserve Banks over 
the last six years by note design and by origin of deposit.  For both types of notes over the 
whole period shown, the foreign share of detected counterfeits is rather small, less than 
10 percent for 1996-series (new currency design, or NCD) counterfeits and around 20 
percent for older-series counterfeits.  However, the incidence of counterfeit detection in 
foreign deposits is closer to domestic levels at about one-half to two-thirds of the 
domestic incidence.  The lower figures for foreign deposits likely reflect two factors. 
First, foreign deposits are smaller because the cost of transporting U.S. currency is 
generally higher from a foreign location than from a domestic location, and thus dollars 
held outside the United States tend to return to Federal Reserve Banks less frequently. 
Second, dollars that do get shipped back to Federal Reserve Banks have likely been 
scrutinized more, because of both their longer lifespan away from Federal Reserve Banks 
and the generally lower labor costs of currency authentication outside the United States. 
Table 6.5 provides data on the very highest grade of counterfeits, the 
“supernotes.” As noted above, supernotes are printed by the intaglio method, the same 
method used by the BEP to print genuine notes.  Nearly all high-grade counterfeits are 
$100s as the labor involved in producing and circulating them apparently does not make 
counterfeiting of lower denominations worthwhile.  The value of the passed notes of this 
variety is a small share of overall passing activity, especially for the NCD notes and 
especially for the United States, for which data are more complete.  In 2001, only $1.2 
million of the $47.5 million worth, or about 2.5 percent, of counterfeit notes passed fell 
into the “highly deceptive” category. 
6.3.4  Secret Service Cooperation Outside the United States 
The statistics in the previous section make it clear that counterfeiting of U.S. 
currency is not just a domestic problem.  In addition to the fact that counterfeit dollars 
circulate overseas, evidence indicates that many of the counterfeit dollars passed in the 
United States originate overseas.
40  Before 1996, contact with the Secret Service by 
40 In FY 2001, 41 percent of the $47.5 million in counterfeit currency passed in the 
United States was determined to be from Colombia. 
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foreign law enforcement officials (including INTERPOL) and financial institutions can 
best be described as inconsistent.  Generally speaking, counterfeiting of U.S. banknotes 
has not been and still is not considered a significant offense in most countries.
41  In 
addition, there was neither a central repository for counterfeit notes nor a coherent policy 
for reporting counterfeit activity. 
Since the beginning of the ICAP program, many improvements have been 
achieved in the Secret Service's investigative techniques and data gathering and, above 
all, in its relationships with the law enforcement and financial institutions.  Field presence 
has increased, and new offices have been established in key strategic locations.  The 
Secret Service now has permanent offices in seventeen cities: Bangkok, Berlin, Bogotá, 
Bucharest, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Lagos, London, Mexico City, Milan, Moscow, 
Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, Rome, Toronto, and Vancouver.  Through these offices, the 
Secret Service can more readily respond to counterfeit inquiries, establish contacts with 
police agencies, offer expert testimony, conduct interviews, and assist in overall 
investigations.  The new offices have already resulted in the seizing of substantial blocks 
of counterfeits and arrests that would not have been possible without an immediate 
presence. 
The Secret Service continues to develop important new relationships with key law 
enforcement agencies worldwide.  On June 27, 2002, the Director of the U.S. Secret 
Service signed a cooperative agreement with the newly formed European Police Office 
(EUROPOL), the central law enforcement agency of the European Union.  This marks 
the historic first official agreement signed between EUROPOL and a U.S. Government 
law enforcement agency.  The Secret Service continues to encourage, facilitate, and 
monitor public education in counterfeit detection.  Overseas initiatives include training 
and education for the banking and law enforcement community through relationships 
developed through its foreign offices, foreign task forces, ICAP, and the International 
Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs).  Additionally, the Secret Service gave 
presentations in November 2001 at Interpol’s Latin American Regional Conference in 
41 A significant exception is the European Union, which has reportedly become stricter 
about counterfeiting of all currencies since the introduction of the cash euro in 2002. 
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Highly Deceptive Intaglio Counterfeit $100s Passed 

Million of dollars 










2.5  1.4  1.1 
3.1  1.5  1.5 
3.2  1.4  1.7 
2.0  1.4  0.5 
1.6  1.0  0.6 
1.2  0.7  0.5 
1.0  0.5  0.5 
14.6  7.9  6.4 
1996-Series (NCD) 
1996 0.0  0.0  0.0 
1997 0.0  0.0  0.0 
1998 0.0  0.0  0.0 
1999 0.0  0.0  0.0 
2000 0.4  0.2  0.2 
2001 0.4  0.2  0.2 
2002 0.4  0.2  0.2 
Total 1996-2002  1.2  0.6  0.6 
Pre-NCD 
1996  1.4  1.1 
1997  1.5  1.5 
1998  1.4  1.7 
1999  1.4  0.5 
2000  0.8  0.4 
2001  0.6  0.3 
2002  0.4  0.3 








With the introduction of the additional offices and the new data collection systems 
described in section 6.1, more comprehensive information can be obtained on the true 
state of counterfeiting in terms of production, longevity, and movement within a given 
geographic region.  The newer contacts, principally in Latin America and eastern Europe, 
coupled with the establishment of Extended Custodial Inventories (ECIs), provide more 
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definitive information relating to criminal activity.  As a result, seizures of counterfeit 
U.S. dollars, detection of international distribution networks, and counterfeit plant 
suppressions have increased. 
Table 6.6 

Top Ten Countries for U.S. Dollar Counterfeiting, Fiscal Years 2000-2002 

Value in U.S. dollars 
Ranked by passing activity  Ranked by seizures 























279,360  15,000  Colombia  0  85,962,640 
149,410  200  Chile  0  12,092,400 
123,160  0  Bulgaria  9,700  4,108,450 
116,630  3,552,630  England  116,630  3,552,630 
111,750  1,600  Poland  3,800  1,771,300 
81,815  293,055  Guinea  0  1,525,900 
59,540  38,030  Peru  100  1,415,180 
29,870  100  Italy  3,695  1,060,100 
23,946  20,500  Portugal  4,350  848,100 
20,440  1,900  Russia  3,400  760,400 
FY 2001

Hong Kong  228,590  0  Spain  48,510  25,312,800 
Mexico 184,177  600  Colombia  2,370  9,493,270 
England 122,660  0  Pakistan  500  2,903,400 
South Africa  86,750  1,554,120  Israel  24,840  2,215,450 
Dominican Republic  82,350  149,000  Germany  35,255  1,896,390 
Switzerland 79,690  298,100  South  Africa  86,750  1,554,120 
Austria 76,320  6,300  Poland  28,430  1,463,600 
Jamaica 63,280  7,400  Turkey  6,070  1,375,950 
Spain 48,510  25,312,800  Bulgaria  860  1,010,100 
Germany 35,255  1,896,390  Belgium  3,330  917,840 
FY 2000 
Hong Kong  356,975  0  Netherlands  2,070  100,005,250 
Mexico  1,715  3,780  Italy  3,510  49,782,820 
England  3,410  141,370  Colombia  3,540  6,730,330 
Kenya  ,950  0  Turkey  9,300  5,801,400 
Dominican Republic  47,681  47,300  Russia  10,006  4,146,100 
Germany 36,931  2,169,176  Nigeria  0  2,776,950 
South Africa  36,150  1,419,990  Brazil  500  2,741,700 
Switzerland 35,400  1,680  Philippines  13,670  2,710,240 
Malaysia 31,600  57,500  France  23,340  2,658,000 





As indicated in table 6.2, in fiscal 2001 the Secret Service reported the seizure of 
$54.0 million in counterfeit currency and the passing of $1.5 million in counterfeit 
currency outside the United States.  While the total of both seized and passed currency is 
comparable to those for the United States (see table 6.2), many more counterfeits are 
seized than are passed, according to statistics compiled from foreign sources.  Thus, this 
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discrepancy in the Secret Service data is illusory since it reflects in part the fact that 
information received on counterfeit U.S.  notes passed overseas is much less 
comprehensive than that received for notes passed within the United States.  The Secret 
Service believes that the true quantity of counterfeit notes passed abroad may be more 
comparable to that passed inside the United States. 
Table 6.6 presents data on the ten most active countries over the last three fiscal 
years, ranked by the total value of counterfeit currency that was reported to the Secret 
Service as seized or passed.  As can be seen, in several countries there were very large 
seizures totaling in the millions of dollars reported, but passing activity reported to the 
Secret Service was extremely limited. 
6.4  Counterfeiting in Key Countries and Regions 
One region (Latin America) and three countries (China, Colombia, and Bulgaria) 
deserve special mention in enumerating the responses that the Secret Service has 
developed to deal with the counterfeiting threats posed abroad.  Colombia registers first 
on the counterfeiting threat list for one reason: It is the chief supplier of counterfeit notes 
to the U.S. market.  Relatively high quality Colombian counterfeit U.S. dollars have been 
successfully imported into the United States for several decades.  The Bulgarian threat 
arose more recently with the growth of organized crime in southeastern Europe. 
Together, counterfeit U.S. dollars produced in Colombia and Bulgaria account for almost 
half (48 percent) of all counterfeits successfully passed in the United States.  China is of 
interest because it seems to be a distribution point for, but not a producer of, high-quality 
counterfeit dollars. 
In the past few years, official and unofficial dollarization of the economies in 
several Central and South American countries has made this region a prime target for 
counterfeiters.  Furthermore, the countries in this region appear to lack the necessary 
resources and enforcement infrastructure required for effective anti-counterfeiting 
operations. 
With regard to counterfeiting, the Secret Service allocates its resources overseas 
based on the overall incidence of counterfeit U.S. dollar activity in a particular 
geographical area.  The Secret Service has found that the strategic placement of its 
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personnel overseas promotes successful foreign police anti-counterfeiting operations. 
Secret Service agents assigned overseas are able to respond more promptly and 
consistently in support of joint international counterfeit currency investigations.  In time, 
the long-standing relationships that develop from day-to-day interactions, liaison 
activities, and training, and the ability to focus consistently on ongoing problems 
encourage foreign law enforcement counterparts to increase the priority given to this type 
of investigation.  In locations where a permanent presence is not feasible, the Secret 
Service employs task forces to target regions with large amounts of counterfeit currency 
(Sofia, Bulgaria, for example). 
6.4.1  Latin America 
Full or partial dollarization in Latin America, along with a relatively low threat of 
prosecution, is making this region an attractive target for the distribution of counterfeit 
U.S. dollars.  Perhaps more significantly, the organizational structures developed to 
manufacture and distribute narcotics in and through this region are ideally suited to the 
secondary task of supporting U.S. dollar counterfeiting operations.  Moreover, given the 
respective penalties involved, these counterfeiting activities entail considerably less risk 
than the drug trade. 
In the past several years, the Secret Service has seen a significant increase in the 
number of packages of counterfeit U.S. currency seized in transit to or through Central 
and South American countries.  Most of these intercepted packages originated in 
Colombia, and were being sent to the United States, Europe, or elsewhere outside of the 
region. 
In June 2002, the Secret Service seized an operation in Colombia that was 
manufacturing a counterfeit U.S. dollar coin (the Sacagawea “Golden Dollar”).  The 
counterfeit coins appeared to be intended for export to Ecuador’s dollarized economy, 
which had recently begun using the coins.  The seized facility was the first clear example 
of the intent by Colombian counterfeiters to target a specific country in Central or South 
America. 
The Secret Service has long recognized the need to expand its enforcement efforts 
and to foster greater cooperation with law enforcement authorities and financial 
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institutions throughout this region.  In August 2002, the U.S. Secret Service, in 
cooperation with the Colombian National Police, hosted the “International Seminar on 
Counterfeit Money: A Latin American Perspective on the U.S. Dollar” in Bogotá, 
Colombia.  This conference brought together senior representatives of law enforcement 
agencies from eighteen countries to learn about characteristics of genuine and counterfeit 
U.S. currency and to discuss investigative strategies for counterfeiting enforcement and 
prosecution. 
Law enforcement officials and prosecutors from Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Mexico, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, as well as representatives 
from Spain, EUROPOL, and the Southern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), 
representing Turkey and Romania attended the conference.  This conference was a major 
initiative on the part of the Secret Service and the authorities in each of these countries to 
address the current and potential threat of U.S. currency counterfeiting.  In addition to a 
mutual pledge to take a proactive stance against counterfeiting in this region, essential 
relationships were established which will have a great impact on future enforcement 
efforts. 
6.4.2	 Colombia: Primary Producer of Counterfeit Dollars Passed in the United 
States 
Colombia is important because it is consistently ranked in the top five of 
counterfeit source nations by value of seized counterfeits.  It has been an important 
source of counterfeit U.S. dollars flowing into the United States for nearly two decades. 
During FY 2001, approximately 41 percent ($19.6 million out of a total of $47.5 million) 
of all counterfeit currency passed within the United States, including 70 percent of all 
offset counterfeit notes, originated in Colombia.  Because large volumes of Colombian 
counterfeits have been entering the United States for many years, in 1997 the Secret 
Service established the South American Task Force (SATF) in Bogotá, Colombia.
42  The 
42The SATF consists of representatives from five law enforcement organizations: 
Departamento de Investigaciones Judiciales de Inteligencia (DIJIN), the Colombian 
National Police, the Cuerpo Tecnico de Investigaciones (CTI), the Departamento 
Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), and the Secret Service, in cooperation with the 
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SATF and the Secret Service’s Miami Field Office, Bogotá Resident Office, and 
Counterfeit Division have been instrumental in training South American law enforcement 
agencies in the detection, interdiction, and suppression of counterfeit U.S. currency. 
During the course of several investigations, the SATF has identified organized 
distribution networks, methods of concealment and transshipment, and contraband 
exchange and payment procedures, and it has developed informants and identified U.S. 
cities targeted for the sale of counterfeit U.S. dollars. 
In May 2001, two U.S. agencies signed an agreement to support a project to 
combat organized financial crime.  The agencies are the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury’s Office of Enforcement, and they agreed to work under the coordination 
of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Enforcement.  Funding for this project 
came from the Colombian Justice Sector Reform Program within the “Assistance for 
Counternarcotics Activities” account of the Plan Colombia Supplemental Appropriation. 
Within this program, the U.S. Secret Service established its anti-counterfeiting 
force in Colombia.  The specific goal of this project is to assist specialized Colombian 
law enforcement units with training, strategy development, and infrastructure 
improvements.  These efforts were all designed to reduce the production, sale, 
distribution, processing, transportation and trafficking of counterfeit U.S. dollars within 
Colombia.  Funding for this Secret Service program was $1.5 million. 
Table 6.7 
Plan Colombia Results, May 2001-August 2002 
Arrests 
Plant suppressions  23 
Counterfeit currency seized  $84.3 million 
Other seizures  $2 million (fraud) 
2 kilograms cocaine 
122 
Colombian National Prosecutor’s Office.  Authority and funding for Plan Colombia 
was provided under the Colombia Justice Sector Reform Program under the authority 
of Chapter 8 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 
2392 (b)) 
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These vetted units, working in conjunction with agents primarily from the U.S. 
Secret Service Miami Field Office and the Bogotá Resident Office, have experienced 
great success in the early stages of Plan Colombia. 
Counterfeiting in Colombia involves organized criminal groups that employ 
skilled individuals familiar with offset lithography and processes to modify various 
substrates (that is, papers) and inks to create good quality counterfeit U.S. dollars.  These 
counterfeit distribution networks frequently employ the same individuals involved in the 
trafficking of narcotics to the United States, and they utilize many of the same smuggling 
methods.  Because of the relatively low penalties for counterfeiting U.S. currency in 
Latin American countries compared with those for narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting 
may be seen as an attractive alternate or parallel activity. 
Suppression of counterfeiting operations in Colombia is complicated by the same 
problems faced in the suppression of narcotics.  Government resources are limited, and 
the country’s sociopolitical issues are complex.  Nevertheless, the Secret Service’s Plan 
Colombia project can claim some major successes.  Secret Service statistics, shown in 
table 6.7, reveal the cumulative impact of major seizures of counterfeit U.S. dollars, plant 
(counterfeit manufacturing operation) suppressions, and dismantling of distribution 
networks.  The increase in foreign arrests has been accompanied by a measurable 
decrease in Colombian counterfeit passing since the inception of Plan Colombia.  Plan 
Colombia continues to grow and develop, with additional law enforcement training, 
special programs, and legislative efforts within Colombia to enhance penalties for 
counterfeiting. 
The Secret Service employs a special canine trained in the detection of 
Colombian-produced counterfeit U.S. dollars through detection of the unique aroma 
present in these notes and supporting materials.  This canine and its handler travel to 
Colombia on a regular basis to participate in proactive anti-counterfeiting activities under 
the Plan Colombia project.  Currently, Secret Service personnel are implementing a 
permanent counterfeit detection canine program in Colombia.  The program includes the 
construction of kennels and canine training areas, canine procurement, the training of 
canines and handlers in counterfeit detection, equipment and supplies, veterinary care, 
operational procedures, and cost analysis.  The success of this program will depend on 
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the commitment to training and to the strategic use of these canines as a deterrent to the 
smuggling of counterfeit U.S. dollars out of Colombia. 
Historically, Colombian counterfeiters arrested in Colombia have been able to 
avoid significant jail time by having their sentences converted to an administrative fine. 
The fact that many of those arrested are repeat offenders indicates that arrests are not 
much of a deterrent in Colombia.  This issue has been repeatedly addressed in various 
meetings with Colombian officials, including the currency audit delegation from the 
Treasury and Federal Reserve to Colombia in October 1998. 
Since 1998 the Secret Service has been working with the government of 
Colombia to reform its penal code with regard to the trafficking in counterfeit currency 
(to include U.S. currency).  These reforms seek to abolish administrative fines and to 
impose a mandatory term of imprisonment for any person convicted of importing, 
exporting, acquiring, receiving, or negotiating foreign or domestic counterfeit currency in 
Colombia.  As of September 2002, a penal code enhancement for counterfeiting was 
being supported and was proceeding within the Colombian Congress. 
6.4.3  Bulgaria: Another offset counterfeit producer 
In March 2002, the U.S. Secret Service formally joined forces with the Bulgarian 
National Service for Combating Organized Crime (NSCOC) to form the Bulgarian 
Counterfeit Task Force (BCTF).  The production of offset counterfeit dollars in Bulgaria 
is second only to that in Colombia.  Since 1996, over $6.7 million in counterfeit U.S. 
currency manufactured in Bulgaria has been passed or seized worldwide, and over 
seventy-five related arrests have been made. 
The BCTF is staffed with a Secret Service agent temporarily assigned to Sofia, 
Bulgaria, and is supported by additional temporary duty agents.  The BCTF has 
concentrated on two major families of counterfeit U.S. dollar notes, and has seized over 
$3.3 million, suppressed several manufacturing operations, and made a number of arrests 
in several highly successful operations.  The Secret Service continues to work with the 
Bulgarian authorities and confidential informants in a number of active investigations. 
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6.4.4  China 
Unlike Colombia and Bulgaria, which are prime sources of offset counterfeit 
notes, mainland China is of interest because it appears to be a country in which a large 
amount of counterfeit can be found, quite possibly considerably more than would be 
suggested by the information on counterfeits received in Hong Kong, see Table 6.6. 
Prior to the ICAP team’s October 2002 visit to China, statistical data on the incidence of 
counterfeit U.S. dollars in China came from two sources: processing statistics compiled 
by the two Hong Kong ECI facilities and other information (mostly involving law 
enforcement counterfeit seizures) collected and verified by the Secret Service’s Hong 
Kong Resident Office (HKRO).  The total from these two sources rarely exceeded 
$500,000 in any given year.  However, information gathered from the trip raised the 
possibility that these reported figures represented the tip of the iceberg. 
During its visit to China, the ICAP team learned that People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) statistics indicate that mainland Chinese banks have been receiving between $4 
to $6 million in counterfeit U.S. dollars annually.
43  While the ICAP team was not able to 
substantiate these figures by the usual means of directly inspecting the suspect notes, they 
could determine that the PBOC had a well-developed process for handling, archiving, and 
maintaining statistics on counterfeit U.S. currency.  Furthermore, Secret Service 
representatives on the team examined a small sample of counterfeit notes provided by the 
PBOC in Shanghai and determined that the majority were of high quality. 
While the resolution of the uncertainty on the true size of counterfeit U.S. 
currency inside China awaits further cooperative efforts on the part of the Secret Service 
and the Chinese, the Chinese expressed considerable willingness to improve their ability 
to detect counterfeit notes and to share information about them with the Secret Service. 
In particular, both the banking and law enforcement authorities the team met with 
understood that training and suppression efforts regarding counterfeit U.S. dollars were in 
43 This finding is not that surprising given that Hong Kong was the leading country for 
reported foreign counterfeit passing in each of the last three fiscal years, see Table 6.6. 
Hong Kong serves as a consolidation point for the Asian banknote markets, and is a 
major point for both the distribution and collection of banknote activity with China. 
Thus, it is highly likely that a significant number of the counterfeit notes detected in 
Hong Kong banks arrived in shipments from mainland China. 
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the mutual interest of both countries.  Some of the suggestions for a strengthened 
relationship included: Providing recurring training to bank and law enforcement 
personnel on counterfeit note detection, encouraging reporting of statistics on a regular 
and ongoing basis on all counterfeit U.S. currency detected, providing samples of 
counterfeit notes, encouraging the use of the USSS counterfeit note website, sharing 
information of criminal intelligence value, and establishing procedures for regular 
meetings and continuing liaison. 
The ICAP team recommended arranging for additional training and coordinated 
programs with the Chinese authorities soon after introduction of the new U.S. currency 
design, which is due to be issued in late 2003.  The Chinese agreed with the Secret 
Service’s suggestion that it would be important for officials on the mainland to improve 
their infrastructure for currency authentication and the handling of counterfeits prior to 
the arrival of millions of foreign visitors, who would undoubtedly be bringing large 
amounts of dollars and other banknotes when they went to China for the summer 
Olympics in 2008 and for other sightseeing activities. 
6.5  The Changing Nature of the Counterfeiting Threat 
The mission of the Secret Service has always been to keep counterfeit production 
in check in the United States, but it now faces a constant battle in keeping abreast of 
improvements in technology that make digital counterfeiting easier and cheaper.  Less 
than ten years ago, computer-generated notes were generally of poor quality.  The 
computer printers and the software available could not generate images of sufficiently 
high resolution to be deceptive.  It is estimated that over 50 percent of the households in 
the United States now have computers.  The prospective digital counterfeiter can obtain 
the necessary computer hardware and software to produce a reasonably deceptive 
counterfeit note for less than $2,000. 
The value of counterfeit currency passed in the United States over the three fiscal 
years 1995–1997 was fairly stable; however, in FY 1998 it jumped by about a third, from 
around $30 million to around $40 million.  Technological advancements in the printing 
field contributed to this increase.  Since the emergence of newer methods of producing 
counterfeit banknotes, the percentage of inkjet counterfeit notes has dramatically 
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increased, as seen in table 6.8.  Many inkjet-produced counterfeit notes are of lesser 
quality than notes produced on offset presses, but their quality is high enough to deceive 
many commercial establishments.  In addition, as shown in the middle columns of table 
6.6, the dramatic increase in the supply of inkjet counterfeits has led to a concomitant 
sharp increase in plant suppressions and related arrests.  However, this phenomenon is 
not exclusively or even mainly a juvenile problem: in fiscal year 2001, only 20 percent of 
inkjet counterfeiting cases involved juveniles. 
Table 6.8 

Digital Counterfeiting Activity within the United States 











(percent)  Inkjet 
Inkjet 
share 







1995  0.5  153  29  19  1,856  37  2 
1996  3  198  101  51  1,737  176  10 
1997  19 435  321  74  2,436  1,100  45 
1998  43  616 547  88 3,569  2,618 73 
1999  40  677 651  96 3,466  2,846 82 
2000  47  551 527  96 3,467  2,998 86 
2001  39  651 608  93 5,241  4,536 87 










Thus far, the problem of digitally printed notes is largely a domestic one, 
reflecting the fact that the United States has a knowledgeable and widely dispersed group 
of personal computer users.  However, as the personal computer revolution moves 
worldwide, it is reasonable to predict that digital counterfeit usage will follow.  In the 
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, recognizing the 
threat to our nation’s critical economic infrastructure posed by financial crimes, included 
the counterfeiting of U.S. currency in the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT) Act of 2001.
44  On October 26, 2001, the President signed the act into law. 
44H.R. 3162 
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This legislation, among other things, modified existing counterfeit statutes to 
accommodate emerging and future technologies, such as digital technology, as well as to 
strengthen maximum statutory penalties for counterfeiting violations.  This new law 
amends the U.S. criminal code to make counterfeiting statutes apply to all counterfeiting 
activity regardless of the technology employed.
45 
On November 1, 2001, the Federal Sentencing Commission issued new, amended 
sentencing guidelines that included penalty enhancements for counterfeit currency 
violations.  The new guidelines provide enhanced minimum penalties, regardless of the 
volume of counterfeit involved in the offense; enhancements for manufacturing; and 
enhancements for possessing or controlling “distinctive counterfeit deterrents.”  The 
latter enhancement applies when counterfeiters attempt to simulate security features 
present in genuine currency, particularly in the new design U.S. currency from 1996 and 
later. 
Both the USA PATRIOT Act and recent federal sentencing enhancements 
demonstrate recognition on the part of lawmakers of the sharp growth in digital 
counterfeiting and related computer crimes.  Recent events have heightened awareness of 
the threat posed by organized criminal groups, including those counterfeiting the U.S. 
dollar.  Continued cooperation in worldwide enforcement, legislative, and educational 
efforts will enhance the security of our nation’s financial infrastructure, to include the 
strength and security of the U.S. dollar. 
In sum, the fight against counterfeiting is dominated by three current factors. 
First, the 1996 and 1999 series notes will continue to displace older notes, and future 
design changes in U.S. currency will render it even more resistant to counterfeiting. 
Second, digital technology used to produce counterfeit U.S. currency is becoming easier 
and cheaper to use and acquire, making the use and awareness of counterfeit-resistant 
features by the public, businesses, and financial institutions more important if we are to 
stop counterfeiting at its initial or first pass.  Third, partly as a result of the earlier phase 
of this project, communication among dollarized and dollar-sensitive economies about 
4518 U.S.C. sections 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 
484, and 493.  Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act, U.S. Criminal Code penalties 
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counterfeiting must continue to improve, thus making enforcement and suppression more 
effective and efficient. 
for counterfeiting distinguished between traditionally-printed counterfeits and 
photocopier- or computer-produced notes. 
67 7  Estimates of Counterfeiting 
This chapter presents the calculations that form the basis of a point estimate and 
estimated upper bound on the quantity of counterfeits in circulation.  The estimates are 
based on counterfeit data collected by the Secret Service and Federal Reserve, together 
with current understanding of circulation patterns for genuine and counterfeit currency. 
The value of counterfeits in circulation is most likely around $70 million, or fewer than 
one in 10,000 notes, with about 60 percent of these held overseas.  The upper bound is 
estimated to be about $170 million, or about 2.8 in 10,000 notes. 
Very good sample data on counterfeits are available from two sources that can be 
considered independent in various dimensions.  Both sources suggest that the incidence 
of counterfeits in the population is quite small, on the order of one to two notes in 10,000 
for $100 notes.
46  To develop appropriate confidence bounds for extrapolation, we 
compare the data from these two sources.  In addition, using currency-processing data, 
we are able to estimate the degree to which the currency received by the Federal Reserve 
is likely to be representative of the total population of currency outstanding.  We also 
consider the impact on the estimates of the currency that circulates only infrequently 
through Federal Reserve processing centers.  We conclude that it is unlikely that pockets 
containing large numbers of counterfeits exist for very long outside the banking system. 
In sum, counterfeiting is not currently a serious problem for the U.S. economy as 
a whole.  However, evidence indicates that the level of counterfeiting remains low 
precisely because counterfeiting is diligently investigated and prosecuted.
47  As 
mentioned previously, technological advances aid both the Secret Service, which is in 
charge of enforcing counterfeiting laws, and the counterfeiters, who use all available 
tools to attempt to perpetrate a very lucrative type of crime.  Thus, counterfeiting will 
remain in check only as the Secret Service is able to act vigorously to prevent it. 
46We focus on $100 notes here because they account for about 70 percent of the value of 
currency in circulation and about 80 percent of the value of counterfeits passed. 
47This conclusion is also supported by the analytical model of counterfeiting that we 
consider in section 7.1. 
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The first section describes a general economic model that explains the level of 
counterfeiting.  The second section reviews the data sources available, and presents 
comparisons of the two major datasets.  The third section presents our estimates.  The 
fourth section presents estimates of how representative the notes that pass through the 
banking system are and presents a model of currency circulation that demonstrates that it 
is quite unlikely that a large pool of counterfeits can circulate undetected.  The fifth 
section concludes. 
7.1  Theoretical Work 
The few theoretical papers on the economics of currency counterfeiting conclude 
that there are only two possibilities for long-run equilibrium, either very low or very high 
levels of counterfeiting.  There is no middle level of counterfeiting.  More specifically, 
given the actual level of enforcement against counterfeiting and the level of counterfeit 
deterrence in the genuine notes, the economy can reach two alternative equilibria: Either 
counterfeit currency takes over, as in a situation in which Gresham’s law holds (that is, 
bad money drives out good) or counterfeit notes hardly get any foothold whatsoever 
(Lengwiler, 1997).  In Lengwiler’s model, the equilibrium that actually occurs is a 
function of the note's production cost (that is, the difficulty of counterfeiting it) and its 
face value.  The higher the cost of counterfeiting and the higher the value of the note, the 
more likely the monetary authority is to invest more in higher-cost notes and thus insure a 
near-zero-counterfeiting equilibrium.  U.S. banknotes, especially the pre-NCD series, had 
significantly fewer counterfeit protection devices than the banknotes of many other 
industrialized countries and were low in value relative to other countries' currency 
issues.
48 However, as Green and Weber (1996) point out, the technology now embedded 
in the 1996-series NCD $100 approached that of other countries' currency, and the new 
series of notes are expected to once again bring the technological level of U.S. currency 
close to that of other currencies. 
Clearly, if the high-counterfeiting equilibrium had some real-world relevance, one 
would not observe the large demand for dollars that exists in most parts of the world. 
48The highest denomination now issued is $100.  In contrast, many other countries issue 
denominations with values between $500 and $1000. 
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Rather, the other, low-counterfeiting equilibrium in Lengwiler’s model appears to be 
consistent with the actual data on counterfeiting in which the frequency of counterfeits is 
on the order of only one in 10,000.  In terms of the economic model described above, 
these outcomes suggest that the level of counterfeiting deterrents embedded in U.S. notes, 
combined with the level of law enforcement provided by the Secret Service and its 
foreign counterparts, has been adequate to keep the economy operating at the low 
counterfeiting state, given the two possible equilibria that could occur. 
7.2  Data Sources 
The two primary sources of data on counterfeiting are the Secret Service and the 
Federal Reserve.  In addition, this project has obtained some institutional knowledge 
from banks, currency dealers, banknote shippers, and other officials responsible for 
currency distribution and counterfeit detection around the world. 
7.2.1  Secret Service Data 
The Secret Service collects data on all counterfeits found in the United States as 
well as all counterfeits it receives abroad.  For every counterfeit obtained, the Secret 
Service records its characteristics and the location of its discovery.  Their statistics for 
notes that are seized before being put into circulation are kept separately from those for 
counterfeits detected while in circulation.  This distinction is important for the estimates 
of counterfeits in circulation, in which we focus on the notes that were passed (actually 
used in at least one transaction).  While the number of notes seized is important from a 
law-enforcement perspective, only the notes that were actually placed into circulation 
generate an economic loss to the general public.
49 
Although the Secret Service data are the most comprehensive available, the data 
on the passing of counterfeit dollars outside the United States are incomplete for two 
major reasons: First, counterfeit U.S. dollars found abroad may be retained by banks, 
returned to customers, or held by local law enforcement authorities without being 
49 We consider the Secret Service data on counterfeit passing within the United States to 
be complete or nearly so.  While banks or individuals who detect counterfeit dollars 
could in principle retain them, by law they must be turned over to the Secret Service, 
and it would be highly unusual for banks to make a practice of retaining them. 
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reported to the Secret Service; second, the capacity of the Secret Service itself to detect 
and seize counterfeit U.S. currency overseas is directly related to its ability to develop 
working relationships with the appropriate agencies and officials overseas--detection of 
counterfeits is highest in countries in which the Secret Service has the best ties with local 
law enforcement agencies.  As shown in the top panel of table 7.1, the amount of 
counterfeit currency passed (and detected) in the United States in 2001, $47.5 million, 
was much greater than the amount the Secret Service seized (that is, intercepted before it 
was circulated) in the United States, $12.6 million.  Outside the United States, however, 
the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency reported as seized is much higher than the 
amount reported as passed ($54 million and $1.5 million respectively).  Because some 
counterfeits found outside the United States are not reported to U.S. authorities, the 
Secret Service believes that the true amount of U.S. notes passed abroad is considerably 
larger than the reported amount. 
Table 7.1 

Latest Data on Counterfeits 

Millions of dollars except as noted 
Domestic  Foreign
* Total 
Secret Service, Fiscal  Counterfeit $100s passed  33.9  1.3  35.2 
Year 2002  Counterfeit $100s seized  8.1  117.0  125.1 
All counterfeits passed  42.9  1.4  44.3 
All counterfeits seized  9.7  120.4  130.1 
Counterfeit $100s detected  4.27  0.73  5.00 Federal Reserve System, 
2002
 All counterfeits detected  n.a.  n.a.  7.01 
Detection rate for counterfeit  33.6 20.4 30.7

$100s, notes per million 
Detection rate for all counterfeits, 
notes per million 
n.a. n.a.  5.0 
Note: “Seized” refers to counterfeit currency that was detected before being circulated, while “passed” 
denotes currency that was determined to be counterfeit after entering circulation.  Only passed 
currency represents a loss to the public; seized counterfeits represent only a potential threat. 
*Includes foreign data for New York, Miami, El Paso, Houston, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Los 
Angeles. 
n.a. Not available. 
7.2.2  Federal Reserve Data 
Each Federal Reserve Cash Office collects data on its cash processing activities, 
including counterfeit detection.  These data are useful in three ways.  First, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, which is the major port of entry and exit for international 
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shipments of U.S. dollars, is able to identify the country of origin for many of the 
counterfeits it receives.  These data, which cover notes that by definition have been 
returned to the United States, complement the Secret Service data, which cover notes 
detected abroad or, in the taxonomy mentioned in the introduction, are circulating but 
remain outside the Federal Reserve.  Thus, the correlation between these two sources can 
be used to calculate confidence bounds for the population of notes in circulation as a 
whole.  Because these data have been developed only recently, however, we present only 
some preliminary results to demonstrate that the samples reveal broadly similar 
distributions of counterfeits by country.  Overall, the Federal Reserve detects about 20 
percent of all counterfeits reported to the Secret Service. 
The second use of Federal Reserve processing data comes from the fact that 
separate statistics are recorded for three classes of notes: All pre-1990 series, the 1990 
series, and the NCD series.
50 About 30 percent of all $100 notes outstanding passed 
through Federal Reserve Cash Offices at least once in the twelve months after the 
introduction of the NCD $100 note, but the notes processed are almost surely not a 
random sample of all notes outstanding.  Notes circulating within the United States are 
likely to return to Federal Reserve Cash Offices more quickly than overseas notes in 
remote areas and areas where dollars are often used more as a store of value than as a 
medium of exchange.  The information on the series date of notes, however, can be 
exploited to obtain estimates of how much of the total currency population is in “active” 
circulation and how much might be hoarded. 
The third use of Federal Reserve processing data is the most direct: From 
counterfeit detection rates and total processing figures, we can estimate the incidence of 
counterfeits among the stock of dollars circulating actively. 
50The first 1990-series notes were issued in 1991 and include a security thread and 
microprinting.  The 1996-series notes were first issued in 1996, in the $100 
denomination.  Among the security features of the latest series are a larger portrait, a 
reflective security thread, a watermark, additional microprinting, and optically variable 
(color-shifting) ink. 
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7.3	 Estimating the Total Quantity of Counterfeits in Circulation 
Worldwide 
The worldwide estimates of counterfeiting rely on a variety of data sources with 
differing characteristics.  Specifically, we have made three sets of calculations to estimate 
the total amount of counterfeit currency now in circulation.  First, we generate a lower 
bound for the total number of $100 counterfeits based on Federal Reserve cash 
processing data.  Second, we generated an upper bound for $100 counterfeits by 
extrapolating from Federal Reserve data to cover counterfeits found outside the Federal 
Reserve.  Third, we generated a range of plausible estimates for all denominations based 
on the relative incidence of $100 counterfeits and lower-denomination counterfeits.  We 
conclude that the total value of counterfeits in circulation at any moment is on the order 
of $70 million, or fewer than 1.2 notes in 10,000, and is highly unlikely to exceed $170 
million, or fewer than 3 in 10,000.  Further, we conclude that the incidence of 
counterfeits is roughly the same inside and outside the United States, and thus the 
distribution of counterfeits follows the estimated distribution of genuine currency, which 
is estimated to be about 55 to 60 percent abroad with the remainder located within the 
United States. 
7.3.1  Estimating the Minimum Stock of $100 Counterfeits in Circulation 
The Federal Reserve keeps records on the origin of counterfeit U.S. notes it 
detects.  However, as a basis for comparison, the exact amount of U.S. currency held 
abroad is unknown.  To take account of the range of possibilities, we use a broad range of 
assumptions on the share of total U.S. currency held abroad.  For shares of currency held 
abroad ranging from 40 percent to 70 percent, table 7.2 presents the counterfeit detection 
rate per million notes and the implied value of counterfeit notes.
51 
The Federal Reserve processing data suggest that the total stock of $100 
counterfeits outstanding is in the range of about $15 million to $18 million, a figure we 
51Although the estimates in Porter and Judson (October 1996) put the share of currency 
abroad between 55 and 70 percent, Feige (1996) presents estimates as low as 40 
percent. 
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consider to be a lower bound for several reasons.  First, the notes sent to Federal Reserve 
Cash Offices are a relatively “clean” sample of the population of all notes in circulation 
Table 7.2 

Counterfeit $100 Stocks Implied by 2002 Federal Reserve Processing Data 

Assuming Varying Shares of Currency Held Abroad

Detection rate (notes 
per million) 
Value of genuine notes held in 
location based on assumption 
(billions of dollars) Location 
Implied counterfeits 
(millions of dollars) 
Assuming 40 percent of U.S. currency is held abroad 
Domestic 33.6  372  12.5 
Foreign 20.4  248  5.1 
Total  . . .  . . .  17.6 
Assuming 70 percent of U.S. currency is held abroad 
Domestic 33.6  186  6.2 
Foreign 20.4  434  8.9 
Total  . . .  . . .  15.1 
Note: Stock of $620 billion assumed. 
. . .  Not applicable. 
in that the notes have already passed through several detection “screens” before reaching 
the Federal Reserve.  If a counterfeit is deposited at a commercial bank, the probability 
that it will remain in the stock of notes sent on to the Federal Reserve is less than 1, and 
most likely substantially less than 1.  Four possibilities for disposal await a counterfeit 
that arrives at a commercial bank.  First, if undetected it could be recirculated or sent to 
the Federal Reserve.  In the latter case, it would appear in the Federal Reserve processing 
data.
52 
Second, it could be detected as a counterfeit, and reported to the police and Secret 
Service.  In this case, the note would appear in the Secret Service's statistics but not in the 
Federal Reserve's statistics. 
Third, it could be detected and returned to the depositor (although virtually no 
U.S. banks return suspected counterfeits to depositors).
53 
52We assume that the Federal Reserve detects all counterfeits in shipments it receives. 
For a discussion of this assumption, see Allison and Pianalto (1997). 
53Nearly every central bank in the world, including the Federal Reserve, forbids this 
behavior on the part of local banks and currency exchanges, but some evidence and the 
ICAP teams’ interviews suggest that it occurs with some regularity outside the United 
States. 
74
Fourth, it could be detected and confiscated but either not reported to the police 
and Secret Service or not released.  Banks are often eager to retain a few counterfeits for 
the purpose of training their own tellers.  In some countries, banks are permitted to report 
counterfeits and then retain the notes.  This set of notes thus does not appear in the 
Federal Reserve statistics but may or may not appear in the Secret Service statistics. 
Counterfeit detection at commercial banks is generally quite good, so we believe that the 
majority of counterfeits that arrive at banks do not get shipped to the Federal Reserve. 
The fact that the Secret Service receives five times as many passed counterfeits as the 
Federal Reserve would seem to bear this out. 
We believe that a counterfeit arriving at a foreign bank is less likely than a 
counterfeit arriving at a U.S. bank to be delivered to the Secret Service or to make it into 
a Federal Reserve deposit for two reasons.  First, U.S. banks are more likely than their 
foreign counterparts to contact the Secret Service directly.  Second, on average, overseas 
banks appear to check their dollar shipments more carefully for counterfeits than do U.S. 
banks, partly because labor costs are so much lower in many foreign countries with heavy 
dollar traffic.  As a result of the higher level of screening abroad, the incidence of 
counterfeits from foreign deposits is just over half of that for domestic deposits in recent 
years (see table 7.2). 
7.3.2	 Using Federal Reserve and Secret Service Data to Estimate the Total Stock of 
$100 Counterfeits in Circulation 
We now return to the estimate of the total stock of counterfeits.  As noted above, a 
lower bound for the estimate of $100 counterfeits in circulation is $15 million to $18 
million.  Within the United States, about six or seven counterfeit $100 notes are detected 
outside the Federal Reserve for each note found by the Federal Reserve.  An estimate of 
counterfeit $100s in circulation based on this ratio would be about $105 million to $125 
million.  This estimate, however, should be viewed as an upper bound, for reasons similar 
to those discussed above.  The counterfeits found outside the Federal Reserve are, in 
general, of lower quality and more easily detected (hence their detection outside the 
Federal Reserve).  Thus, they probably do not circulate for as long as the counterfeits that 
75
survive until reaching the Federal Reserve.
54  A middle-range value of about $70 million, 
or less than 1 counterfeit $100 in every 7,000 $100 notes in circulation, is the most likely 
estimate. 
7.3.3  Extrapolating from $100 Counterfeits to All Counterfeits 
Table 7.1 indicates that $100 counterfeits are between 75 and 80 percent of all 
counterfeits recorded by the Secret Service and 71.3 percent of all counterfeits found by 
the Federal Reserve.  Extrapolation from the estimates for the $100 note suggest that the 
$70 million baseline should thus be inflated by a factor of 1.25 to 1.40, for a total of 
about $88 million to $98 million, or about $1.50 in counterfeits for every $10,000 of 
currency in circulation.  If we extrapolate from the upper and lower bounds discussed 
above, the lower bound estimate for counterfeits of all denominations is about $15 
million, or 25 cents per $10,000 in circulation, and the upper bound is about $175 
million, or $2.8 per $10,000 in circulation. 
7.4  The Next Step: How Unrepresentative Are Our Data? 
The estimates constructed above rely heavily on the assumption that the samples 
are representative.  However, the samples could be unrepresentative along several 
dimensions.  First and most crucially, suspected counterfeit notes could perhaps find their 
way into an isolated pool of currency that never reaches the banking system.  Second, 
notes from some countries could be returned for processing more readily than others. 
Third, counterfeit detection capability could vary widely across countries. 
In appendix B of the first report to the U.S. Congress on this subject, we 
developed two models that highlighted the reasons that notes are unlikely to remain 
outside the banking system indefinitely.  Both of these models suggest that large 
quantities of counterfeits cannot hide anywhere for too long.  With regard to the third 
concern, the varying counterfeit detection rates in different regions, the relatively close 
match between Secret Service data and Federal Reserve data suggests that the country 
distribution of counterfeits is unlikely to be radically different from what is observed in 
the available counterfeit data. 
54Appendix B in the previous report takes up the issue of the lifespan of a counterfeit. 
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7.4.1  Hoarding: Some Empirical Evidence from the Team’s Travels 
One cannot rule out the possibility that a large batch of counterfeits has been 
inadvertently hoarded along with genuine notes, but an episode in Korea in 1998 suggests 
that fears about this problem may be overdrawn. 
After the sharp depreciation of the Korean won in the fall of 1997, a media-led 
campaign encouraged Koreans to deposit their dollar holdings with the government to 
help resolve the financial crisis that had arisen.  At the time of the call for dollars, 
counterfeiting in Korea could have been a large problem.  Korea was one of the very few 
countries in Asia that had traditionally been willing to accept fit (previously circulated) 
notes in its wholesale shipments of notes; wholesale shipments are likely to contain 
counterfeits, whereas shipments of new notes are necessarily free of them. 
As a result of this campaign, the government collected $1.5 billion in U.S. 
currency from Korean residents during a grace period in January and February 1998. 
During the grace period, the government agreed to not question the source of any funds 
turned in.  The dollars were all carefully inspected for counterfeits.  In this repatriation of 
stockpiled currency, which must be one of the largest ever conducted, Korean officials 
found only 0.018 percent to be counterfeit, or $264,000.  That is, they found counterfeits 
at the rate of 1.8 counterfeits per 10,000 notes, a result in line with counterfeit incidence 
elsewhere in the world. 
Thus, this natural experiment reinforces the notion that significant stockpiles of 
currency do not necessarily entail significant quantities of counterfeits.  More generally, 
since unexpected events continually lead individuals to draw upon their precautionary 
holdings of currency to meet unforeseen demands, there is a sense in which the 
stockpiled currency is always being sampled. 
7.4.2  Scant Evidence for Pools of Undetected Counterfeits 
Perhaps some counterfeits circulating abroad escape detection by circulating as 
part of a pool of U.S. currency that (1) never enters the banking system or enters banks 
that don’t detect the counterfeits and (2) in any case never returns to the United States, 
where the counterfeits would almost certainly be discovered. 
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On the basis of the teams’ visits, these two possibilities seem highly unlikely. 
During their visits, the teams found that counterfeit detection capabilities are very good at 
central banks, commercial banks, and authorities charged with stopping counterfeiting 
and that the overall condition of the circulating currency is reasonably good in most 
places most of the time.  These observations are consistent with the idea that counterfeits 
do not endlessly circulate outside the banking system.  Currency is used for a wide range 
of transactions; but even in gray or black market economies, it will eventually find its 
way into a commercial banking institution, most likely after being used in relatively few 
transactions.
55  Appendix B.2 of the first report puts these ideas together in an analytical 
model. 
7.4.3  Comparing the Country Distributions of Counterfeit Notes 
Below we present two comparisons of three data sets that have been assembled 
largely independently of one another.  The comparisons point to similar estimates for the 
distribution of counterfeits, which in turn suggest that, despite the shortcomings of the 
data sets, they are representative of currency and counterfeiting activity worldwide.  First, 
we compare the counterfeiting data from the Federal Reserve with that from the Secret 
Service.  Second, we compare the counterfeiting data from the Secret Service with the 
Federal Reserve estimates of the amount of genuine currency circulating overseas. 
7.4.3.1  Country-by-Country Comparisons 
In principle, the country-by-country data on counterfeits detected at the Federal 
Reserve Cash Offices should be a subset of the Secret Service data.  Under certain 
55One application of the isolated pools theory has been in stories that one or more 
governments hostile to the United States had obtained genuine plates for printing U.S. 
currency and were producing a flood of counterfeits to destabilize the dollar.  Part of 
the scenario was the assertion that these counterfeits could circulate endlessly and 
freely within the bounds of such countries.  We have no way of confirming or denying 
such stories.  If closed countries do indeed have many counterfeits in circulation, it is 
impossible to know so long as the system remains closed.  The evidence and model we 
present here apply to open markets.  Moreover, in a closed system in which everyone is 
aware of the counterfeits, the loss to consumers and potential for destabilization is not 
clear.  A more formal model of these ideas can be found in appendix B.2 of the 
previous report. 
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conditions, moreover, the proportions of counterfeits detected by country and region 
should be similar in both data sets.  However, neither of these conditions holds exactly in 
the data we present here, and as a result, the ratios do not exactly coincide, though most 
observations do fall within two standard deviations of the mean absolute deviation. 
Two conditions are necessary for the country-specific counterfeiting data sets to 
exactly match both each other and the true country distribution of counterfeits.  First, the 
Secret Service's ability to detect counterfeits would have to be exactly uniform across 
countries, which is surely not the case given variation in staff size, relations with local 
law enforcement, and other local factors.  Second, the notes processed by the Federal 
Reserve would have to be a random sample of the notes in circulation in a given country. 
This condition is somewhat more likely to hold.  Although some currency is held for long 
periods, and some currency is selected for return to the United States because it is unfit, 
estimates on hoarding presented in the first report suggest that notes circulate fairly 
randomly. 
The Secret Service data used here cover only notes passed to the public; they do 
not include notes seized, since these notes by definition were never in circulation.  The 
figures used here are for fiscal year 2002.  Since the Secret Service dataset includes 
counterfeits found by the Federal Reserve, the Secret Service's figure for each country 
should be greater than the Federal Reserve's figure.  Countries are dropped if the Secret 
Service's records show fewer counterfeits than the Federal Reserve's records. 
Each point in figure 7.1 represents one country's share of the counterfeits detected 
in each data set.  Thus, a point at (5,10) would indicate that 5 percent of the counterfeits 
detected at the New York Federal Reserve Cash Office came from that country while 10 
percent of the counterfeits detected by the Secret Service did.  These points would all lie 
on the 45-degree line if the relative detection rates between the two data sets agreed and 
if the samples of notes processed were exactly representative of the notes in circulation. 
The dashed lines represent a 95 percent confidence interval around the 45-degree line. 
Since most of the points associated with the individual country pairs lie within 
the confidence band, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the relative detection rates in 
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1 7.4.3.2  Testing the Location of Counterfeits with Dollar Estimates in Various Parts 
of the World 
Are the data on counterfeit dollars found in various locations outside the United 
States in basic agreement with our understanding of the distribution of all dollars in 
broadly defined regions? Presumably, counterfeits cannot easily “hide” among genuine 
notes when the number of counterfeits is relatively large. 
currency supply is growing in a region, holders of the currency will eventually learn 
about the counterfeiting problem and become more wary of acquiring a counterfeit in 
their day-to-day transactions.  ounterfeit dollars are dispersed throughout the 
world up to the point at which residents of any country would become suspicious of their 
dollar holdings, the distribution of counterfeits across the world might match that of the 
currency as a whole.  the costs of distributing counterfeits, which 
are not necessarily likely to be evenly distributed across parts of the world. 
Table 7.3 
Expected and Actual Distribution of Counterfeits 

















Africa and the Middle East  $247,958  $209,640  20  16.9% 
Americas  $309,948  $242,626  25  19.6% 
Asia  $457,530  15  36.9% 
Europe and the former USSR  $495,917  $329,996  40  26.6% 
*Actual data are for fiscal year 2002 
Table 7.3 compares the percentage distribution of currency holdings in four 
If the proportion of counterfeit 
Thus, if c
The proposition ignores 
$185,969 
regions: Africa and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia, and Europe and the countries in 
the former Soviet Union.  This distribution combines the best judgmental information at 
the Federal Reserve about the distribution of currency (column 4) with the Secret 
Service’s data on the distribution of counterfeits that were passed into circulation 
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(column 5).
56 Columns 2 and 3 list the expected and actual distribution of counterfeits 
under the assumption that it is proportional to currency holdings in these four broadly 
defined regions.  A standard statistical test of these data suggests that the counterfeit and 
currency distributions match each other in terms of the relative amounts found in each of 
these four regions.
57 
7.5  Conclusion 
In sum, we estimate that about $70 million, or fewer than 1.2 counterfeits per 
10,000 notes, might be in circulation at any one time.  In addition, we consider a range of 
$15 million to $175 million, or between 25 cents and $2.80 per $10,000 in circulation, to 
be an exhaustive confidence interval.  It is indeed possible that a large number of 
counterfeits could be injected into the financial system, but they would likely be detected 
and removed fairly quickly given what we know about cash transactions and the banking 
system.  We believe that the close correlation between the country distribution of 
currency holdings and the counterfeits detected by the Federal Reserve and the Secret 
Service is strong evidence that both counterfeit detection and incidence fall within a 
small range throughout the world. 
56The counterfeits that could not be assigned to any region by the Secret Service were 
assigned according to the distribution of those that could be assigned. Information on 
seized (never circulated) notes is not used because they are irrelevant to the question of 
interest, which is how easy or difficult it would be to pass counterfeits. 
57 The test statistic of the null hypothesis that the points lie on the 45-degree line has a 
value of 5.98 and is distributed as a chi-square with 3 degrees of freedom. 
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8  Summary and Conclusions 
This study reports the results of a joint Treasury and Federal Reserve 
investigation of currency usage and counterfeiting activities abroad; it updates the first 
report to the U.S. Congress in January 2000.  Activities consisted of study trips to areas 
of the world where dollars circulate and, subsequently, the establishment of facilities to 
encourage both recirculation of fit currency and repatriation of old-series currency.  The 
audit plan that we have used in this study takes account of all of the available information 
and understanding that the Treasury and Federal Reserve possess concerning overseas 
counterfeiting and currency holdings.  Following the congressional mandate, it is based 
on three components: Models of U.S. currency usage overseas, models of counterfeiting 
abroad, and information obtained from country surveys with cash handlers and others 
knowledgeable about the extent of currency usage and counterfeiting issues abroad. 
8.1  Overseas U.S. Dollar Holdings 
For some time, U.S. dollars have been the currency of choice internationally.  In 
countries with underdeveloped banking sectors and unstable currencies, U.S. dollars are 
held in cash as a store of value, are used for transactions, and act as the unit of account, 
especially for larger transactions.  Although dollars flow into countries when the 
domestic currency becomes very unstable or political crisis looms, they do not 
necessarily flow out when the crisis passes.  Even in some countries with developed 
banking sectors and stable currencies, dollars are the preferred currency for travelers, for 
cross-border trade, for settlement of large cash transactions, and for transactions in the 
informal or gray sector. 
The Federal Reserve supplies currency on demand and implicitly accommodates 
new demands that originate anywhere in the world.  Various procedures developed by 
Federal Reserve staff suggest that about $370 billion of the $620 billion in banknotes in 
circulation are held overseas.  Although the circumstances in each country are unique, 
demand for U.S. dollars (or indeed any other currency that circulates widely outside its 
home country) during a crisis does follow certain patterns.  In a simple model of this 
process, the demand for the foreign currency (dollars) depends on the volatility of 
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inflation and the differential between the inflation rate in the United States and the 
developing country.  The degree to which a country becomes dollarized and the degree to 
which residents desire cash dollars rather than dollar-denominated bank accounts depends 
on confidence in the domestic banking system.  The quantity of cash dollars demanded 
also depends on a country’s experience with dollars in the past and its economic 
circumstances. 
Although estimates about overseas currency holding are necessarily imprecise, a 
confidence interval estimate in the neighborhood of $300 billion to $400 billion brackets 
most of the direct and indirect information we have on such holdings.  To take the next 
step of making estimates for individual countries or regions is considerably more 
difficult.  For one thing, most currency held outside the United States is used for 
transactions so it is in constant circulation and as a consequence repeatedly moves across 
borders.  While the Federal Reserve data and Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports 
provide information on shipments to and from various countries and the United States, 
there is no information about currency movements between other countries, nor is there 
reliable information about smaller quantities of currency leaving the United States or 
moving outside of wholesale channels.  Our best guess is that about 25 percent of 
overseas holdings are in the western Hemisphere, 15 percent in the Far East, and 20 
percent in the Middle East and Africa.  The remaining 40 percent is in Europe, including 
the former Soviet Union and some of its trading partners such as Turkey. 
8.2  Overseas Counterfeiting 
Given that so much genuine U.S. currency is held overseas, how much counterfeit 
U.S. currency is also located abroad?  Before the rollout of the NCD $100 note in 1996, a 
number of news stories suggested that there might be a significant international 
counterfeiting of U.S. banknotes.  While there was considerable skepticism about the 
accuracy of such stories, it was recognized that the Secret Service’s limited authority 
outside the country might create vulnerabilities, at least in some regions.  Inside the fifty 
states and territories, the Secret Service has jurisdiction over counterfeiting cases, and 
information about counterfeiting is routinely channeled to the Secret Service.  Outside the 
United States, however, the Secret Service has limited jurisdiction over counterfeiting 
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cases involving U.S. currency.
58  Further, procedures invoked when counterfeit notes are 
found overseas vary widely. 
During the teams’ visits to abroad, the level of concern about counterfeiting 
varied among countries, but banks and other financial institutions detected one or at most 
only a few counterfeit notes of every 10,000 notes they processed.  In FY 2001 the Secret 
Service reported the seizure of $54.0 million outside the United States and the passing of 
$1.5 million in counterfeit U.S. currency abroad.  This discrepancy between the passed 
and seized figures overseas reflects in part the fact that data on counterfeit U.S. notes 
passed overseas are inherently partial: The Secret Service's knowledge about 
counterfeiting of U.S. dollars is more complete in countries in which it has better ties 
with local law enforcement agencies. 
While counterfeiting rates are currently relatively low, it does not follow that one 
should necessarily be sanguine about the future.  Only a decade ago or so, most 
counterfeits were produced by offset printing presses, which inherently limited the supply 
because of the limited number of presses and skilled printers.  But now the nature of 
counterfeiting appears to be moving from offset printing technology to computer 
technology--PCs, software, and relatively inexpensive printers--for which prices are 
falling and accessibility is rising.  For example, of the counterfeit currency printing 
operations suppressed inside the United States during FY 2001, 93 percent used inkjet 
printers, a phenomenal increase from the FY 1995 figure of 19 percent.  While inkjet 
technology is only beginning to spread internationally, there is every reason to believe 
that it will continue to do so.
59 Given these technology changes, concomitant 
improvements in both banknotes and Secret Service procedures are needed to stay ahead 
of the advancing counterfeiting threats.  In addition, improvements in Secret Service 
capabilities are necessary, including more field offices and improvements in the 
traditional methods of record keeping.  The Secret Service has increased foreign offices 
58 The Secret Service must rely on the cooperation of host-country law enforcement 
officials. 
59 For one reason estimates suggest that the growth of inkjet printers over the next 5 years 
will grow by over 60 percent faster abroad than domestically. 
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and task forces significantly since the ICAP trips began in 1994.  Regarding record 
keeping, the Secret Service has recently developed two new systems to improve 
statistical reporting: The Counterfeit Contraband System and the Counterfeit Note Search 
Site on the Internet. 
8.3  Currency Distribution and Education Campaign 
Historically, new U.S. banknotes have been attractive to the international market 
for one reason: Their newness guarantees that they are counterfeit-free.  The 1996 NCD 
Currency Introduction Plan provided for the establishment of an Extended Custodial 
Inventory pilot program to facilitate the introduction of NCD notes, expedite the 
repatriation of the old-design banknotes, and promote the recirculation of fit NCD notes. 
In addition, a key objective of the ECI program was to facilitate information flows about 
the circulation of both genuine and counterfeit currency.  Both of these goals have been 
realized: Currency circulation and redistribution have become more efficient, and the 
European and Asian ECIs have become important direct sources of information on 
external counterfeiting, as the Secret Service receives information directly from ECI 
operators regarding counterfeit notes detected during their verification process. 
In addition, the ECIs provide a natural safety valve for increases in currency 
demand related to events such as the century date change or the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.  By stockpiling U.S. currency inventories in strategic international distribution 
centers, banks and currency dealers overseas have an assured, immediate supply of U.S. 
currency to meet unforeseen demand for banknotes resulting from financial or political 
disturbances and to mitigate financial panics. 
The Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have a duty to inform 
and educate all users of U.S. currency about prospective changes to the currency and 
policies with regard to the treatment of older-series notes.  In general, the worldwide 
education program has been successful in disseminating information about currency 
changes and must be continued. 
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8.4  Conclusions and Recommendations 
There are five main conclusions.  First, the audit program of the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve has continued to open new lines of communication and data collection 
on the use and circulation of genuine and counterfeit U.S. banknotes abroad.  In addition, 
relationships have been developed with the banknote trading communities and law 
enforcement agencies that allow the Federal Reserve and the Secret Service to work more 
effectively in the international arena.  The Federal Reserve and the Treasury expect that 
these benefits will grow as the program continues. 
Second, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s management of the Extended 
Custodial Inventory (ECI) program has improved the efficiency and stability of the 
international dollar banknote markets, has contributed enhanced data and qualitative 
information on international U.S. currency flows, and has resulted in the more timely 
detection and reporting of counterfeit U.S. banknotes. 
Third, given the NCD and upcoming new series notes’ greater resistance to 
counterfeiting, strategies to accelerate the repatriation of old-design notes should be 
considered. 
Fourth, the Secret Service has obtained valuable information through the audit 
program, and will continue to draw upon information arising from the audits to evaluate 
its international strategy. 
Fifth, the public education campaign contributed to the smooth reception of the 
new-design 1996-series (NCD) $100 notes but had some major shortcomings for the 
introduction of the smaller denominations, particularly in overseas markets.  In the future, 
dissemination of information on any new currency design—especially training and 
educational material for both cash handlers and the general public—should reach the 
international markets well ahead of the actual notes in an appropriate range of foreign 
languages and should be readily available well after the initial issuance of the notes. 
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